Photo by Wendell Alinea/Senate Social Media Unit

Manuel Mogato | September 8, 2026

MANILA — The country’s civil registry office told the Senate impeachment court that millions of pesos in confidential and intelligence funds from Vice President Sara Duterte went to “ghost” recipients, including children and the deceased.

Taking the witness stand on the 22nd day of Duterte’s impeachment trial, Marizza Grande, assistant national statistician at the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), said her office had checked the names of more than 2,699 people given to them by the House of Representatives as recipients of the vice president’s confidential and intelligence funds in 2022 and 2023 because the names appeared to be unusual and funny.

Some recipients have names such as Pagong (turtle), Pusa (cat), Matsing (monkey), or snack foods like Piattos and Oishi, private prosecutor Mae Divinagracia told the court. (Also read: Prosecution unveils more auditing rules violations in Vice President’s use of confidential funds)

When verified from the PSA database, matching the names with live birth, marriage, and death records in the agency’s file, about 63 percent did not match.

Grande said the PSA also found that 20 were the names of children who were born just months before the Office of the Vice President and the Department of Education started handing out rewards for confidential information gathered.

Another 37 names were deceased, including a two-month-old infant who died in 1965, based on the death records at the PSA.

More than 1,287 names from the Office of the Vice President and 398 names from the Department of Education could be fictitious and did not match the PSA records for live births, marriages, and deaths.

Divinagracia said Duterte’s offices submitted more than 4,000 acknowledgement receipts, with the names of the recipients, in 2024 to liquidate the 612 million pesos in confidential and intelligence funds.

But she said only 2,699 were sent to the PSA for checks because their names appeared in the acknowledgement receipts. The rest were only unrecognizabke signatures.

The PSA’s database has more than 97 percent of all 120 million Filipinos based on the 2024 census. Those not in the database are Muslims in the south and indigenous people in the mountains, and a few who failed to register a birth, marriage, or death.

Divinagracia said the inclusion of minors and the deceased, and more than 1,500 names that did not match the PSA database, only bolstered the prosecution’s theory that the money was spent on something else.

Duterte’s defense lawyers said the PSA did not find the names of the recipients of the confidential funds because they used “aliases” and “codenames” in the intelligence work.

The PSA database does not keep aliases and government codenames, the defense lawyer argued.

If convicted, Duterte will be removed from office and will be barred from seeking any public office.

Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. at Cebu City Hall for the West Philippine Sea (WPS) Victory Day at Cebu City Hall last July 13, 2026. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | September 6, 2026

MANILA — Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr has set two important requirements for the Philippines to enter into deals with defense contractors for military platforms, parts, and critical supplies.

Appearing before the House Appropriations Committee to justify the Department of Defense’s 324.6 billion pesos spending for 2027, Teodoro said his office will prudently allocate the meager budget to upgrade deterrent capability to protect national interests.

Sustainment and infrastructure support are essential in acquiring vessels, aircraft, armored vehicles, drones, and missile systems, he told lawmakers, pleading for a higher budget as regional tensions rise and greater uncertainty looms. (Also read: The military modernization fund faces big challenges)

When asked by lawmakers what the department’s priority concerns are, Teodoro pointed out two things before a government-to-government (G-to-G) deal will be awarded to a contractor for military equipment and weaponry.

First, the contractor and the country that will supply critical equipment, defense technology, or weapons systems must be aligned with the Philippines’ position on the West Philippine Sea issue.

Thus, like-minded countries have a clear edge in winning big-ticket contracts for vessels, aircraft, and other military equipment, parts, and accessories. (Also read: Philippines gets $100 million from the United States in 2027)

The Philippines has listed the following as among its major defense suppliers for brand-new or second-hand platforms or equipment: Australia, Brazil, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, Israel, India, South Korea, Japan, and Indonesia.

These countries are among staunch supporters of the Philippines’ position in territorial claims in the South China Sea. A few of them have even entered into deeper and broader defense cooperation, including status-of-forces agreements (SOFA).

Other like-minded states, such as Canada, France, and Germany, are among those offering assistance to the Philippines, such as training, exercises, and other forms of defense cooperation.

Teodoro said the Philippines will not accept any country that may wish to provide material or financial assistance and any other forms of engagement if these states support China’s excessive and illegal claims in the South China Sea.

He said the Philippines would not want to share a table with any country that also deals with military equipment, technology, or logistics with China. (Also read: Teodoro calls on a coalition to resist China)

Second, the Philippines will not make deals with states at war with another state because there could be a potential disruption in the supply chain, particularly for spares, parts, and other components.

For instance, the Philippines has halted entering into deals with Israel due to the ongoing conflict with Iran and other non-state actors, like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Teodoro said the only contract with Israel involved the restocking of short-range Strike ER missile systems after some were used for the Navy’s training purposes.

A Polish company had completed delivery of 48 S-70i Black Hawk helicopters, and a South Korean shipyard delivered two of four Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). The other four vessels will be constructed in a shipyard in Subic.

Indonesia is also set to deliver two Landing Platform Docks (LPDs), the largest naval vessel in the Philippines’ inventory.

A South Korean shipyard could be awarded a large logistics vessel, and a South Korean aircraft maker won a contract for a squadron of FA-50s to be delivered starting in 2028.

Brazil won a second contract for six A-29 Super Tucano to complete a squadron of 12 turboprop close air support aircraft.

Teodoro said the Armed Forces has 10 ongoing projects under the three-phase, 15-year revised modernization program, originally set at 300 billion pesos.

However, only two phases were funded under the Aquino and Duterte administrations. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has revised the third horizon program several times, now costing the government over 1 trillion pesos.

For 2027, Congress has allocated 50 billion pesos for the military’s modernization program.

However, almost 80 to 90 percent of the fund will go to paying for the amortization of equipment acquired in the last two administrations.

Less than 10 billion pesos would be left to fund new acquisitions.

Teodoro has limited options to fast-track the military upgrade program, including taking out loans and selling military properties.

Defense spending hovers a little over 1 percent of GDP, far from 3 percent, which the US has been pushing its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region to share the burden in countering China’s rise.

Vice President Sara Duterte visiting Ateneo de Zamboanga University on Friday, September 4, the same day the warrant for her arrest was released. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | September 6, 2026

MANILA — Vice President Sara Duterte appeared on a Saturday before a local court to post a bail bond for her temporary liberty after she was ordered arrested for threatening the president, his wife, and cousin last November 2024.

Accompanied by her battery of lawyers, she paid 360,000 pesos for three counts of grave threats filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) before the Quezon City regional trial court which acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Outside the court, some of Duterte’s followers gathered to show support. It took time for the vice president to enter the courtroom because she expressed fears for her safety.

“I do not feel safe,” Duterte said, despite dozens of security detail around her. “I don’t trust the court, I don’t trusr the police.”

She said she felt she “would be killed.”

The defiant vice president did not allow herself to be photographed in detention shirt, submitting her own photo to the court.

Congressman Terry Ridon immediately criticized the vice president’s “special treatment.”

Ridon, who was among prosecutors in the impeachment case of the vice president before the Senate said the Philippine National Police has waived its ordinary booking procedures in the case by not taking Duterte’s mugshot.

“It is clearly a case of special treatment that does not speak well of the rule of law and the equality of persons before the law,” Ridon said, advising Duterte to “drop the drama and be accountable for your actions.”

The case stemmed from a November 2024 video showing an angry Duterte threatening to assassinate President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, his wife Liza Araneta-Marcos, and his cousin, former Speaker Martin Romualdez. (Also read: NBI has 20 persons that can identity Vice President “killer”)

Duterte got mad after her chief of staff was ordered transferred to a women’s correctional facility from the a detention room at the House of Representatives after she was cited in contempt during a congressional hearing..

Her threats were also among the articles of impeachment before the Senate. Her defense team at the Senate did not dispute the video conference was authentic but qualified the threats were just outburst due to frustration and she did not mean it.

If convicted by the Senate, she will be removed from her position and will be barred from seeking any public office. Early this year, she had announced her intention to seek the presidency in 2028.

Royal Navy personnel onboard HMS Tamar meet with servicemen from the Royal Cambodian Navy last August 28. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | September 6, 2026

LONDON — A British Royal Navy vessel sailed in the South China Sea alongside the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Perth to exercise freedom of navigation in disputed waters, the defense ministry said in a statement.

The defense ministry said a joint British and Australian navies asserted navigational rights in waters where China maintains expansive claims.

The activity has been conducted in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and that the UK remains committed to upholding a free, open and stable South China Sea, the defense ministy added.

HMS Tamar is one of two Batch 2 River-class offshore patrol vessels forward-deployed to the Indo-Pacific since 2021 alongside sister ship HMS Spey, part of a deliberate effort to give the UK a persistent role in the region.

The pair provide the RN’s only permanent surface presence across a vast operating area, combining defence engagement, sanctions monitoring and sovereignty patrols.

In June 2025, HMS Spey and the Hobart-class destroyer HMAS Sydney conducted a freedom of navigation activity around the Spratly Islands.

Days earlier, Spey had transited the Taiwan Strait, the first Royal Navy passage since HMS Richmond in September 2021, prompting Beijing to describe the move as “a deliberate provocation.”

China claims most of the South China Sea within its so-called nine-dash line, a position largely rejected by an international arbitral tribunal ruling in 2016.

The UK takes no side in the competing sovereignty disputes of the littoral states but asserts the freedoms guaranteed to all nations under UNCLOS. (Also read: Think tank lauds growing global support of 2016 arbitral ruling)

The People’s Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command says it conducted patrols in the South China Sea between 21 and 27 August, a reminder that these are among the most heavily militarised waters in the world.

Manuel Mogato | September 5, 2026

TAIPEI — Taiwan has proposed an additional $4.59 billion in defence spending for 2026, including ‌systems for drones and anti-ballistic missiles, to counter military pressure from China.

In May, Taiwan’s opposition-controlled parliament approved additional defense spending of $25 billion, about two-thirds of what the government had sought in a special budget, and only for spending on U.S. weapons. (Also read: Taiwan raises defense spending to build air defense to counter China’s threats)

Following a weekly meeting, Taiwan’s Cabinet said, “there can be no gap in national defense”, and plans for a special budget were now being incorporated into this year’s new supplementary budget.

Taiwan plans to acquire a medium-tier, anti-tactical ballistic missile system, a locally developed Strong Bow missile. (Also read: Preparing for a humanitarian crisis if conflict erupts in Taiwan)

Spending plans also incorporate more than 600 coastal surveillance and reconnaissance drones, over 40,000 coastal attack drones, and the first batch of over 100 small suicide drone boats, Reuters reported.

“National security cannot wait, the defence budget cannot wait, and defence self-reliance cannot wait either,” Reuters reported, quoting the Taiwan Cabinet.

Last month, parliament approved a six-year plan to spend $240 billion on drones, which in principle sets annual spending at $40 billion, and rejected a competing government plan for $210 billion.

For next year, the government has proposed overall defence spending to top $1 trillion for the first time.

Taiwan, like U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere, faces calls from Washington to spend more on its own defense, something President Lai ‌Ching-te has enthusiastically embraced.

Lai has also rejected Beijing’s sovereignty claims, saying only the island’s people can decide their future.

Screengrab from Vice President Sara Duterte’s online media briefing in November 2024 where she made assassination threats.

Manuel Mogato | September 5, 2026

MANILA — A regional trial court has issued an arrest warrant against Vice President Sara Duterte-Carpio for making death threats to the president, his wife, and first cousin in 2024, her lawyer said.

Duterte is the first sitting vice president to face criminal charges in a local court. The same complaint was the subject of an impeachment trial that could remove her from office and ban her from seeking any public office.

Paul Lawrence Lim said the vice president “has no intention of evading the law and will continue to exercise all her legal remedies” after receiving a copy of the arrest warrant.

In a separate statement, the Department of Justice (DOJ) said the Quezon City court had set the bail at 120,000 pesos for each count of grave threats. (Also read: Vice President’s threats were “serious” — witness)

The city’s Branch 98 court also denied the vice president’s motion to defer or recall the warrants against her. She faced three counts of grave threats.

“The Department respects the Court’s ruling and reaffirms its commitment to the rule of law,” the Justice Department’s spokesman Raphael Martinez said.

“The actions taken today strongly demonstrate the government’s dedication to ensuring that all officials operate within a framework of integrity and accountability,” the Justice Department said in a statement.

The actions taken today strongly demonstrate the government’s dedication to ensuring that all officials operate within a framework of integrity and accountability,’ the DOJ says

He said three counts of grave threats were filed against Duterte in August, in connection with assassination threats against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and his wife Liza and cousin, ex-House Speaker Martin Romualdez.

The National Bureau of Investigation has filed grave threats against Duterte after her infamous midnight press conference on November 23, 2024. (Also read: NBI has 20 persons that can identity Vice President “killer”)

She had told supporters not to worry about her safety, saying she had already “talked to someone” who would assassinate Marcos and his family if she were killed.

Duterte repeated the threats, saying she was not joking.

The grave threats were also part of the four articles of impeachment against Duterte in her ongoing impeachment trial.

Duterte’s lawyers had also sought oral hearings, arguing that Duterte cannot face a criminal case because she is an impeachable official.

Legal experts have said the vice president is not immune from suit, unlike the president.

Congresswoman Leila de Lima, who was jailed during her father’s administration, said Duterte may not be used to being held accountable, “but now she must answer the accusations against her in a criminal court.”

Law enforcement authorities raided the Philippine Sanjia Steel Corporation manufacturing plant in Misamis Oriental last May 16, apprehending 69 undocumented Chinese workers in the steel site along with one Filipino national. Official handout.

Rommel C. Banlaoi | September 3, 2026

Though the controversy surrounding Philippine Sanjia Steel Corporation in Misamis Oriental began as a straightforward law enforcement action, it has since evolved into a diplomatic flashpoint. What was initially framed as a raid against alleged violations of labor, immigration, and nuclear safety laws now involves Manila, Beijing, and Washington underscoring how domestic regulation can quickly intersect with geopolitics.

Philippine authorities accused Sanjia Steel of importing radioactive scrap metals from China and producing substandard rebars that threaten public safety. Dozens of Chinese workers were arrested, the plant was closed, and its environmental compliance certificate revoked. The Bureau of Philippine Standards found its rebars failed to meet national standards. These actions were presented as evidence-based enforcement.

Yet, the Chinese Embassy strongly denounced the raid as selective enforcement, portraying it as undue harassment against Chinese nationals. This reflects Beijing’s enormous sensitivity to the treatment of its citizens abroad and its broader narrative of defending Chinese enterprises.

China’s position deserves closer examination. The Embassy emphasized that Chinese workers were unfairly singled out, suggesting discriminatory application of Philippine law. Beijing framed the arrests as part of a pattern of “selective enforcement,” echoing its global posture of protecting its diaspora and enterprises.

By portraying the Sanjia case as harassment, Beijing sought to shift the discourse from regulatory compliance to fairness and human rights, raising the controversy as racial discrimination rather than mere industrial safety.

The issue deepened when reports surfaced of U.S. military personnel visiting the Sanjia site in preparation for next year’s Balikatan exercises. While the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the U.S. Embassy clarified the visit was routine, the Chinese Embassy raised suspicions of a possible military conversion of the facility. Such suspicions illustrate how even industrial zones can be interpreted through the lens of strategic competition.

For the Philippines, the Sanjia Steel case highlights three important imperatives:

First, the government must uphold regulatory standards to ensure public health and infrastructure integrity. The discovery of radioactive isotopes in steel bars is a serious safety issue that could compromise buildings nationwide.

Second, immigration and labor laws must be enforced fairly, without appearing to target any nationality.

Third, the government must manage the diplomatic consequences of actions that, while domestically justified, carry international implications. These imperatives are difficult to reconcile, particularly when foreign powers interpret local enforcement through geopolitical frames.

A balanced approach therefore requires transparency and consistency. It is essential for Philippine agencies to demonstrate that enforcement actions are evidence-based and applied uniformly across all firms, foreign or local.

At the same time, Manila should further engage Beijing diplomatically to explain its regulatory decisions, while reassuring Washington that Philippine sovereignty remains paramount. (Also read: Teodoro accuses China of “interference” in Philippine affairs)

By doing so, the Philippines can avoid being cast either as hostile to Chinese investment and government or overly dependent on U.S. military support. Credibility rests on enforcing standards without prejudice while resisting external pressures that seek to turn domestic issues into geopolitical battlegrounds.

China’s concerns are understandable. Beijing’s insistence that its nationals are being unfairly treated reflects genuine concerns about the welfare of its citizens abroad. It also reflects China’s broader strategy of portraying itself as a defender of fairness in international relations.

The Philippines must acknowledge these concerns diplomatically without compromising regulatory integrity in order de-escalate current tensions in bilateral ties. Dialogue that emphasizes transparency and adherence to law can reassure Beijing that enforcement is not politically motivated, while reinforcing Manila’s sovereign right to regulate industries. (Also read: Pragmatic Nationalism: A Philippine Foreign and Security Policy Framework)

Apparently, the Sanjia Steel controversy goes beyond industrial compliance. It raises issue on how the Philippines manages relations with two major powers while safeguarding national interests.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s recent announcement of a “reset” to stabilize relations with China, provides the prudent approach. Stabilizing ties with Beijing does not mean abandoning sovereignty or compromising safety standards but creating needed diplomatic spaces where disputes can be managed responsibly, cooperation pursued in areas of mutual benefit, and misunderstandings reduced before they further escalate.

Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD, is Director of the Philippines–China Studies Center at Diliman College and President of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies. He served as President of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies.

Attorney Michael Poa, education department’s former chief of staff and finance officer, and also a part of Vice President Duterte’s defense team, takes to the stand before the Senate impeachment court on Wednesday, September 2, 2026. Photo by Joseph B. Vidal / Senate Social Media Unit

Manuel Mogato | September 3, 2026

MANILA — A lawyer, who has close links to Vice President Sara Duterte, on Wednesday testified at the Senate impeachment court he relied solely on the education department’s disbursing officer when he responded to state auditors who flagged discrepancies in the confidential and intelligence funds.

Taking the witness stand, Michael Poa, education department’s former chief of staff and finance officer, said he was clueless on how the secret fund was liquidated because only the disbursing officer and the head of agency knew how the department’s 112 million pesos confidential and intelligence funds were used.

He was also unaware the department has a security officer who he did not meet during his stay at the agency headed by the vice president even if he prepared the response to the 2024 findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) on the agency’s confidential funds use.

“Actually, it was the first time I learned there was a security officer,” Poa said when he attended a congressional hearing in October 2024.

He was declared as the third hostile witness of the prosecution after former Office of the Vice President special disbursing officer Gina Acosta and OVP Assistant Secretary Lemuel Ortonio. (Also read: Disbursement officer points to the Vice President for approving a fund transfer to an Army colonel)

Colonel Dennis Nolasco who served as security officer handled the confidential and intelligence fund for the education department.

Poa said he found nothing wrong when former special disbursing officer Edward Fajarda transferred the funds to Nolasco for disbursement, a violation of the joint circular on confidential spending, which states that only the SDO shall disburse the secret funds.

When COA slapped DepEd with an audit observation memorandum in February 2024, it had flagged the agency’s P75 million in confidential spending due to insufficient documentation.

In his response to state auditors, Poa attached four Army certifications showing success of its youth leadership summits.

The DepEd had liquidated 15 million pesos for reward payments in connection with the activities.

But two Army colonels had testified the military did not get any funding from the education department, which Poa confirmed. (Also read: Education department uses the Army’s certification of participation to justify confidential funds)

Poa said the 15 million pesos was given to informants who provided intelligence information to the Army.

“It’s not to fund an event but it’s to fund the gathering of information as to target areas…. Where does recruitment happen? Where is insurgency rampant?” Poa said.

The prosecution’s strategy was to show that Poa did not have knowledge of the secret expenditures he had defended to COA.

The atmosphere at a hospital in Nakhon Sawan province, where patients and their families gather to seek medical care.

Kunravee Sukhimoke | August 30, 2026

BANGKOK — Thailand’s “30 Baht Healthcare” scheme, or Universal Health Coverage (UHC) scheme, introduced nationwide about 25 years ago, has enabled millions of Thais to access healthcare without fear of higher medical bills, a heavy financial burden on their families.

For instance, a villager in Nakhon Sawan province recalled the difficulties faced before the 30 Baht scheme, when treating an illness would cost not only medical bills but also transportation and other expenses.

“I saw someone carrying a child along the road to the hospital because they had no vehicle,” the unnamed villager said. “The child had a very high fever. During the rainy season, it was often dengue fever. I helped drive them to the hospital. Back then, there was no hospital transport. Now it’s better — an ambulance can come and pick them up.”

He also recalled a patient with fluid in the lungs who needed an MRI. At the time, the patient had to travel to another province and faced high costs.

“Without the 30 Baht scheme, where would we get the money to pay for treatment? More than 20 years ago, we had to travel from Nakhon Sawan to Phitsanulok. An MRI cost 30,000 baht. That was a lot of money. Without the healthcare scheme, for some people, the only option would be death.”

However, continuing budget pressures have raised questions about how Thailand can sustain the coverage and quality of the system in the long term.

Funding fails to keep pace with hospital workload

Professor Dr. Manop Pithukpakorn, a member of the Faculty of Medicine Siriraj Hospital, Mahidol University, said the main problem facing the UHC scheme is that funding does not match the workload of healthcare providers.

“The biggest problem now falls on the service providers. It’s about money. The more they do, the more they lose,” he said.

As the number of patients increases, hospitals must provide more medicines, equipment and staff, while funding does not always increase in line with demand.

A receipt showing a 30-baht payment for medical services under Thailand’s Universal Health Coverage (UHC) scheme, reflecting the low-cost healthcare access provided to eligible patients.

Manop outlined three possible options: increase funding to match demand, limit unnecessary services, or allow some form of copayment.

Former Deputy Prime Minister and former Deputy Minister of Public Health Surapong Suebwonglee said it is important to distinguish between copayment, a fixed fee such as the 30-baht charge, and co-insurance, in which patients pay a percentage of their medical costs.

For example, a 10% co-insurance payment on a 10,000-baht medical bill would cost a patient 1,000 baht. On a 100,000-baht bill, the patient would have to pay 10,000 baht.

For higher-income patients, such costs may not be a major obstacle. But for poor households, percentage-based payments could prevent people from seeking treatment or bring back the problems that existed before universal healthcare — avoiding hospitals because of cost or falling into financial hardship because of medical bills.

“Proposals such as amending the National Health Security Act to increase the representation of healthcare providers on the board are not the answer,” Surapong said.

Surapong said the challenges facing the UHC system also include doctor shortages, heavy workloads for healthcare workers, disease prevention and hospital management.

Public hospitals should undergo greater scrutiny of their financial accounts, including revenue and expenditure, and doctors, nurses and other healthcare workers should also receive compensation that reflects their workloads and current living costs.

He cited Ban Phaeo Hospital, a public organisation, as an example of a hospital with greater flexibility in managing its staff and finances, and said the model should be expanded.

Planning for the future with insufficient data

Budget problems in the UHC scheme typically resurface between July and September, the final months of Thailand’s fiscal year.

“It comes back every year, in July, August and September, because that’s the end of the fiscal year. The government’s fiscal year starts on October 1 and ends on September 30.”

Surapong explained that Thailand’s health budget is prepared roughly 18 months in advance, requiring the government to forecast future patient numbers and healthcare costs even though actual demand may change significantly.

Fragmented health data compounds the problem. Although hospitals collect large amounts of information, the data is not fully connected, making it difficult for policymakers to see the full picture of healthcare use and spending.

Surapong has proposed “The 30 Baht AI policy is about connecting all the data … and using AI to forecast what will happen in the next year and a half.”

The goal is to give the government a clearer picture of patient numbers, illnesses and healthcare costs to improve long-term budget planning.

Thailand’s healthcare system and politics

When it was first introduced, the 30 Baht scheme was widely feared to place such a heavy burden on the healthcare system that it could lead to financial collapse. It ultimately became one of Thailand’s major healthcare policy achievements and a model studied and adapted by other developing countries.

The policy also transformed Thai politics. The Thai Rak Thai Party campaigned in the 2001 election on the 30 Baht scheme, village funds and OTOP (One Tambon One Product), winning more than half of the seats in parliament and helping establish “policy-based politics” as a central part of Thai elections.

“It was the first time in Thai politics that a political party used policies as a tool for campaigning... After that, every party had to try to offer policies to tell voters what they would do,” Surapong said.

The government expanded the 30 Baht scheme nationwide on October 1, 2001, just seven to eight months after Thaksin Shinawatra took office as prime minister.

“Thai people’s lives changed forever. People who had never dared to go to the hospital because they had no money... and people who had gone bankrupt because of medical treatment — that disappeared.”

Department of National Defense Undersecretary for Acquisition and Resource Management Salvador Melchor Mison Jr. and UK’s Ministry of Defence Head of Indo-Pacific Amy Senior met in Makato City on Thursday, August 27, for the first round of formal negotiations for the proposed Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA). Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | September 1, 2026

MANILA — Last week, senior defense officials from the Philippines met with their British counterparts to start formal negotiations for a possible status-of-forces agreement allowing British troops to hold exercises and training in the country.

The United Kingdom has expressed interest in entering into a military-to-military deal with the Philippines after France signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement early this year.

Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands are also interested in similar arrangements, as European powers and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members are suddenly expanding their footprints outside Western Europe.

They have similar reasons: to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region, allowing free flow of goods from Europe to countries in the Pacific and vice versa.

The South and East China Seas, where more than $3 trillion of seaborne goods pass annually, are important for Europe’s trade.

Of course, there are other geopolitical reasons, as Beijing is now knocking on Europe’s door, with Chinese troops starting military training exercises along NATO’s borders in Belarus and Russia.

Europe is nervous that China would avenge what many European powers did to China in the 19th century, carving up territories to rule in some areas, like Macau, Hong Kong, and southern China up to Shanghai.

China has reacquired the territories and expanded its borders by annexing Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria, and parts of Mongolia.

Europeans are alarmed at China’s presence along its eastern borders. Thus, they are also making their presence felt in the Indo-Pacific region.

European powers were no strangers to this part of the world, but retreated after the Second World War and during the Cold War, scuttling the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). (Also read: Canada’s expansion in the Indo-Pacific region)

Only the United Kingdom kept a constant presence through its Five Power agreement with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. It also has relations with tiny Brunei.

The United Kingdom and the United States are the two enduring powers in the region. They also joined forces to help Australia build its nuclear-powered submarines under an AUKUS arrangement.

The United Kingdom now wants to expand its footprint in the region to include the Philippines, not only from its former colonies in the region.

Manila is now interested in expanding its alliances with like-minded countries to build deterrence against a rising China.

It needs the support of countries that would counter China’s influence and also help train and improve the warfighting skills of Filipino troops who fought internal security threats. (Also read: Teodoro calls on a coalition to resist China)

Manila is not a stranger to partnership with London. In the 1990s, a British company supplied 150 Simba armored vehicles to the Philippine Army. The British Royal Navy sold three Peacock-class vessels to the Philippine Navy before Hong Kong was handed over to China.

A British company, in cooperation with other European companies, delivered aircraft to the Philippine Air Force in the past.

However, the Philippines should carefully assess how it would benefit from the United Kingdom in terms of training, exercises, and other cooperative activities.

It should consider, for instance, that the United Kingdom has reduced its troops’ strength due to financial constraints. Its dependence on foreign technologies and supplies was also increasing, further straining its resources.

There were also indications that Washington has been dictating its defense plans, as London failed to fulfill its obligations to NATO and other European partners.

There were disturbing reports that London cannot provide full-scale and long-term deployments abroad, like in the Middle East after the US and Israel went to war with Iran.

Because of this, Washington may no longer consider London a reliable partner and a major power.

Based on opinion polls last year, London’s international influence has been waning after the United Kingdom reduced funding for aid programs for poorer Global South countries, including the Philippines, in 2025, dropping to its lowest level in 25 years.

Based on a KPMG-UK forecast in late 2025, the United Kingdom’s GDP in 2026 will drop to 1 percent from 1.4 percent in the previous year due to a rising budget deficit, increased unemployment, and limited household consumption.

The impact of COVID-19 and Brexit also affected London’s export share in the global market, as economists labelled London the “sick man of Europe”.

Defense budget, however, has been growing to sustain the conflict in Ukraine, including a recent decision to share the blueprint for its long-range missiles.

Environmentalists, activists and non-government organizations have also criticized British companies for exploiting poor countries and former colonies, disregarding human rights and environmental pollution.

They singled out the giant Shell company, which contributed to global climate change, particularly in Southeast Asia, through fossil fuel extraction.

Greenpeace, for instance, launched an information campaign against Shell for its contribution to the adverse weather effects, including Typhoon Odette in 2021.

There was also the issue of human rights after the BBC reported in December 2025 that British soldiers were accountable for rights violations in Kenya, where for decades its troops were holding training and drills.

Kenya’s parliament produced a 94-page report detailing British rights violations and other ethical breaches over the years.

Manila should carefully consider London’s offer to deepen military cooperation and the possibility of helping deter China in the South China Sea issue, and assess whether the British can honor its commitments.

Manila may also consider the experiences of former British colonies in Southeast Asia in hosting British troops for training and exercises. (Also read: Reviving SEATO or building an Asian NATO?)

The Marcos administration should assess whether allowing British troops would help the Philippines deter China or would only advance British interests in the region.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr during the presentation of the proposed budget of the Department of National Defense and its bureaus for Fiscal Year 2027, at the House of Representatives last August 25. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | September 1, 2026

MANILA — Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr said the Philippines will likely receive about $100 million from the United States in 2027, part of the $500 million promised under a supplemental budget approved by the US Congress.

Teodoro said the funds will be given under the foreign military sales (FMS) program of the US State Department to help upgrade the Philippine military’s capabilities to deter China’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific area.

Appearing before the House Appropriations Committee early this week, Teodoro said the US military assistance will help meet the military’s minimum requirements to integrate its command-and-control infrastructure and enhance its maritime domain awareness capability.

Teodoro said the defense and military establishments have requested a 350 billion pesos budget for 2027. (Also read: Philippines,United States scale up trainings and exercises in 2027)

However, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) submitted to Congress a total of 324.6 billion pesos in defense spending, or a little over 1 percent of GDP. (Also read: Hegseth urges Asian allies to raise defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP)

The budget did not include 50 billion pesos earmarked for the 2027 military modernization program, which was included in a special trust fund.

More than 143 billion pesos in pension for retirees were also not included, although Teodoro clarified that only less than 50 billion pesos will go to the military.

The rest will go to the coast guard under the transportation department and to the national police, fire and jail personnel under the interior department.

Teodoro said the defense needed more funds to finance construction of new bases in the eastern corridor and a 40 billion dry dock facility near Cagayan de Oro.

He also told Congress a plan to relocate the naval operating base in Sangley Point, Cavite to a larger space in Subic, as well as the 15th Strike Wing, also in Cavite, to an EDCA site at Lumbia Airport in Cagayan de Oro. (Also read: Pentagon official praises ‘progress’ in EDCA sites in the Philippines)

The US also planned to construct warehouses in Lumbia Airport, prepositioning supplies and equipment for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.

Cagayan de Oro will also be the future base of operations of the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) in northern Mindanao, he said, adding the location was chosen because of supply chain considerations and connectivity. (Also read: US plans to set up fuel storage facilities in Mindanao)

Lawmakers promised to pass the defense budget and add some more to give Teodoro some legroom to enhance military capabilities under the modernization program, which will be about to end in 2028.

Most projects under the first and second horizons of the revised modernization program were completed, and the third horizon remained untouched.

But the plan was also revised several times to keep up with technological developments. Some of the equipment has become obsolete.

Teodoro told Congress at least 10 projects had been signed but declined to give specific details other than that the new platforms are needed for maritime security and domain awareness.

He said it is important to have defense suppliers from like-minded countries and without supply chain issues, like Israel, where an ongoing conflict may delay deliveries of equipment and platforms.

He said there are no new orders from Israel, except to replenish short-range missiles that were used in the training.

Soldiers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and members of Japan’s Amphibious/Mine Warfare Group and Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade conducting a full sequence amphibious operations during the 2026 Balikatan Exercises. Photo from Minister of Defense Joint State.

Manuel Mogato | September 1, 2026

TOKYO — Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi planned to ask its parliament to approve a $57 billion budget for the self-defense forces in 2027, a record-high in response to uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific region.

According to Japan’s broadcaster NHK, the 2027 funding includes an unspecified amount for AI-based decision support systems, as Tokyo is set to revise its three national security documents.

It reported that Tokyo will focus on defense capabilities to respond to new methods of warfare that utilize AI and drones.

Tokyo will also prioritize efforts to reinforce the foundation of the nation’s defense and secure the capability to fight for prolonged periods. (Also read: Is a militarized Japan a threat to the region?)

The plans include setting up an AI-based decision support system at the Joint Operations Command, which oversees the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces.

NHK also reported that Japan plans to introduce enhanced cloud systems and develop underwater-launched hypersonic missiles.

Private sector initiative to allow the, to set up to acquire equipment manufacturing facilities, production and management of defense industrial complex would be encourage, the NHK further reported.

As Tokyo expands its international cooperation with like-minded countries, the defense ministry would also set up a new bureaucracy in charge of policies related to international cooperation.

Meanwhile, Japan’s Coast Guard also requested $2.2 billion for next year to counter Chinese presence and activities on Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

But Chinese experts immediatelyc criticized Japan for using China as an excuse to justify the continued expansion of its maritime law enforcement agency.

According to another Japanese news agency, Kyodo, Japan will build eight new large patrol vessels. Seven of them will be developed as part of what the Coast Guard described as “enhanced territorial-water security capabilities” around Senkaku and to “prepare for new threats”.

However, Chinese security experts said Japan has been using China as an excuse to expand its maritime security forces.

Colonels Manaros Boramsing II testifiying before the Senate impeachment court on Tuesday, September 1, 2026. Photo by Joseph B. Vidal / Senate Social Media Unit

Manuel Mogato | September 1, 2026

MANILA — Two Army officers testified at the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte that they were asked to issue certifications of participation at several civil-military activities, but were later used to justify the liquidation of millions of pesos in confidential and intelligence funds in 2023.

Colonels Manaros Boramsing II and Magtanggol Panopio told the impeachment court, separately, that they only learned in October 2024 that the Army’s certifications were submitted to state auditors as proof that the secret funds were used when they attended a congressional hearing.

“The Army did not receive any money from the Department of Education, and we did not receive any confidential and intelligence information,” Boramsing said, who was then the assistant chief of staff for civil-military operations (G-7) for the Army’s 1st Infantry Division in Zamboanga.

The Army’s Central Luzon-based 7th Infantry Division civil-military commander, then Lieutenant Colonel Panopio, also testified they were coordinating with teachers on the ground, and that the information they gathered was based on open sources.

If there was any confidential information, it was about personal circumstances of students, like pregnancies. (Also read: Prosecution unveils more auditing rules violations in Vice President’s use of confidential funds)

An undersecretary at the Department of Education requested the Army’s division commanders to submit a certification on the conduct of several civil-military operations activities in 2023.

“We only certified the participation of other government agencies, but we did not certify the expenses incurred because each agency spends its own funds for the activity,” Boramsing said, adding that the Army spent on soldiers’ food, accommodation, and travel.

The education department was in charge of the venue, the schools, and the participants, normally students aged 15 and above, he added.

Boramsing’s unit conducted eight young leaders’ summits and 53 information and education campaigns in 2023, but spent the Army’s budget for the activities, which amounted to 50,000 to 60,000 pesos for each event.

Panopio’s unit held fewer events, about three youth leaders’ summits in 2023.

But prosecutors said the education department had liquidated a total of 15.5 million pesos for each of Boramsing and Panopio’s units.

It submitted the Army’s certification as proof of the success of the department’s confidential and intelligence activities for 2023.

Two other Army units - the 5th Infantry Division in northern Luzon and the 9th Infantry Division in the Bicol region gave similar certifications to liquidate similar 15.5 million pesos in confidential and intelligence funds.

The amounts were reportedly used to pay for rewards for information gathered by Duterte’s office intelligence personnel.

When Duterte was education chief from 2022 to 2024, her office got an appropriation of 112 million pesos in confidential and intelligence funds. It was separate from the department’s nearly 1 trillion pesos budget.

Duterte also got 500 million in confidential and intelligence funds as vice president.

Both Boramsing and Panopio said they did not interact with Duterte’s security officers, Colonel Dennis Nolasco or Colonel Raymond Dante Lachica, during the youth leaders’ summit and information and education campaigns.

Panopio said there was no confidential and intelligence information gathering during the events, and planning for the activities was done ahead of time.

Boramsing said the Army’s civil-military operations (CMO) activities have been conducted since 2002, and Panopio said they have been coordinating with the teachers even before Duterte was education secretary.

Panopio said his immediate reaction was surprise when he learned the certification he had issued was used as proof to liquidate millions in confidential and intelligence funds.

Duterte has been facing a Senate court to determine if she is fit to stay in her position, and subsequently bar her from seeking any public office.

Prosecutors have been trying to prove she misused 612 million in confidential and intelligence funds, presenting witnesses that said there were unusual cash withdrawals from government banks, improper liquidations, and illegal handling of the funds.

The two Army colonels further proved no special funds from Duterte’s office went to them, but millions were spent and liquidated using their certifications as proof.

Naval and air force units from Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States, conducted a multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA) within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone last 5 February 2025. Photo from the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Manuel Mogato | August 29, 2026

MANILA —As the United States becomes an unpredictable and unreliable security partner in the Indo-Pacific region, middle powers are stepping up to help deter a growing China.

For decades, these middle powers have been reluctant to step onto the batting plate, relying on the United States to lift the heavy load, whether in the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, or the Taiwan Strait.

These middle powers were not necessarily doing nothing to help the United States. They were picking up the slack when the US slowed down. (Also read: “Middle Powers” rise as doubts of US reliability deepen)

For instance, when Washington reduces funding support for international military education and training programs (IMETP) for the Philippines, Australia increases funding for technical and higher military education for Filipinos.

There were instances when Australia exceeded the US financial assistance for education and training.

On the other hand, Japan has become a source for used or second-hand military platforms, such as surface combatant vessels and surveillance aircraft, as the United States has shifted from mothballed to brand-new platforms under purely commercial deals.

Australia and Japan have become more reliable security partners for the Philippines than the United States. The two countries have also increased their presence and activities in the Philippines, including periodic multilateral maritime cooperative activities (MMCA).

Since MMCA started in 2024, there have been 19 iterations involving Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.

For the Philippines, these military activities boosted Manila’s deterrence. It also enhanced presence in disputed waters in the West Philippine Sea, particularly around Bajo de Masinloc, Ayungin Shoal, and other Philippine-occupied features. (Also read: Teodoro calls on a coalition to resist China)

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr visited Darwin while the Philippine Air Force takes part in the Pitch Black exercise to forge closer cooperation with Canberra.

The two countries are close to concluding a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that would further expand existing military training and exercises, such as Alon and Kasangga in the Philippines.

The DCA could also enhance Australia and the Philippines’ arrangement under the so-called Squad — Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States.

But there could be a downside, as other middle powers’ presence and activities in disputed areas heighten tension and increase miscalculation and accidents that could lead to confrontations.

Security experts have observed that Australia and Japan are now playing key roles in the military and political plans of the Western alliance, including the US, India, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Indo-Pacific area. (Also read: Reviving SEATO or building an Asian NATO?)

These countries have intensified efforts to form and strengthen an anti-China bloc. Beijing can also create its own counter-bloc, making the volatile region more dangerous.

These developments threaten to escalate an arms race, provoke tension, and increase the chances of conflicts in the region.

For one, Australia planned to build nuclear-powered submarines under the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) alliance.

Delays in the building of nuclear-powered submarines did not deter Australia from partnering with Japan to build 11 Mogami-class frigates for $6.5 billion.

Canberra and Tokyo also planned closer cooperation to produce other munitions and other materials, creating a strategic partnership that could reduce the risk of attacks from China on industrial military bases and build a so-called strategic depth.

At the same time, granting access to Tokyo’s naval forces at Canberra’s port facilities could increase Japan’s operational reach and expand maritime security missions beyond the East and South China Seas.

Australia and Japan’s partnership strengthens the Quadrilateral arrangement, including India and the United States.

The two countries’ partnership fills the potential vacuum when the US focuses more on the Middle East, but nothing will change in the Indo-Pacific area.

The dominant United States will be replaced by several middle power states, fueling a more dangerous arms race.

The bigger danger would be an ambition by these states to acquire nuclear weapons, threatening the non-proliferation regime as well as Southeast Asia’s nuclear-weapons-free zone area.

If that happens, the region’s security architecture may change, making the region dangerous.

US Soldiers at the Cagayan North International Airport, or Lal-lo Airport, during the annual Balikatan exercises last April 22, 2026. Lal-lo Airport is one of the nine EDCA sites. Photo by Sgt. Jonathan Beauchamp, 3rd Marine Division.

Rommel C. Banlaoi | October 28, 2026

Although the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States has become a focal point of debate in our national security discourse, it is paramount to critically examine studies that claim to assess its implications. (Also read: What’s the reason behind US expansion of military engagements in the Philippines?)

A recent Tearline report, “An Examination of US and PRC Influence at the EDCA Sites in the Philippines” (2026), produced under National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)-reviewed methodology, offers descriptive mapping of EDCA facilities. But it regrettably suffers from methodological and evidentiary gaps that limit its policy relevance.

Strengths and Weaknesses

The study’s strength lies in its compilation of open-source materials and its attempt to visualize influence dynamics around EDCA sites. Maps and geospatial overlays provide a useful starting point for analysts.

However, the methodological framework, the grounded theory, is not strictly applied. Grounded theory, based on my limited knowledge, requires systematic coding of fieldwork or interviews. Yet the study fails to show if such fieldwork has been rigorously conducted. Instead, the report presents heavy sources on English-language news, social media posts, and advocacy statements. For a study claiming to assess “mechanisms of influence” at the community level, the absence of Filipino-language sources and household-level data is also a serious methodological flaw.

The evidentiary base is in fact uneven. The Fraym.io survey snapshot from late 2024 is the only original quantitative input. But its methodology is undisclosed, making sentiment figures unverifiable.

Other data points conflate disparate sources: remittance figures from 2016 are used to explain recruitment claims in 2024, while tabloid reports substitute for official records on land acquisition, crime, and student enrollment. This weakens the credibility of the findings and its conclusions.

Analytical Balance

The report’s treatment of the China threat is apparently overstated. Correlation is often presented as causation, with Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) operations, land fraud, and student enrollment near EDCA sites framed as probable “intelligence playbook” indicators without triangulation against Philippine law-enforcement findings, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) threat assessments, or People’s Republic of China (PRC) embassy denials. (Also read: Teodoro accuses China of “interference” in Philippine affairs)

The distinction between criminal, commercial, and state-directed activity, which is central to credible influence analysis, is blurred. Even the 40 percent equity stake of State Grid Corporation of China in the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) is treated as a near-existential “kill switch,” reproducing congressional claims without acknowledging NGCP’s rebuttals or subsequent corporatization debates. This inflates legitimate governance concerns into speculative sabotage scenarios.

By contrast, risks to Philippine host communities are treated superficially. Opposition from groups such as Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Amihan, and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) is noted, as is the fear that towns could become “high-value targets” in a Taiwan Strait contingency. Yet these are framed as perception-management issues for U.S. messaging rather than substantive strategic risks. Displacement of farmers and fisherfolk, livelihood disruption from no-sail orders and live-fire exercises, and the securitization of ancestral land are documented mainly through single advocacy sources.

The imbalance is obvious: detailed but unverified accounts of PRC influence, thin treatment of human security costs. This produces a skewed risk picture overstating certainty of Chinese subversion while understating escalation exposure for Filipino civilians. (Also read: Pax Silica: Is the Philippines willing to give up its sovereignty in Clark?)

Policy Relevance

For policymakers, the key lesson is to exercise caution. This Tearline report should be treated as a compilation of open-source leads, not a validated threat assessment. Any follow-on analysis must be more careful in distinguishing between criminal activity and state-directed operations, so that ordinary crime is not automatically and maliciously conflated with espionage.

Survey methodology must also be disclosed in full to ensure transparency and credibility. Philippine government data should be systematically incorporated to strengthen evidentiary grounding. Furthermore, risks to host communities must be analyzed with the same diligence applied to external influence narratives, so that alliance commitments are balanced with human security concerns.

A More Realistic Approach

The Philippines must navigate EDCA with utmost prudence. For the Philippine government, alliance cooperation with the United States remains vital for deterrence and capacity-building. At the same time, however, overstating the China threat without rigorous evidence risks inflaming tensions and undermining credibility. In addition, understating the human security costs of EDCA sites risks alienating local communities and eroding domestic support.

A realistic approach therefore requires symmetrical two-level analysis: scrutinizing both external influence and internal vulnerabilities with equal rigor. It also requires grounding assessments in Philippine realities, institutions, communities, and above all, sovereignty.

For Washington, credible analysis means listening to local voices and respecting Philippine data sources. For Beijing, constructive engagement means clarifying intentions and addressing concerns about influence in ways that reassure host communities. For Manila, it means applying a comprehensive approach to ensure that alliance commitments do not come at the expense of civilian safety, livelihood and even friendly relations with China.

Conclusion

Beyond geopolitics, EDCA pertains to the lived realities of Filipinos in host communities, the credibility of Philippine institutions, and the delicate balance between alliance obligations and national sovereignty.

Studies like Tearline’s can really contribute to the needed debate, but only if their findings are treated as preliminary leads rather than definitive assessments.

Policymakers therefore must demand methodological transparency, evidentiary balance, and nuanced analysis. EDCA can only advance Philippine security and serve the interest of Philippine society if it can demonstrate that it is credible, sustainable, and just while maintaining constructive relations with both the United States and China.

Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD, is Director of the Philippines–China Studies Center at Diliman College and President of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies. He served as President of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies.

Department of National Defense Undersecretary for Acquisition and Resource Management Salvador Melchor Mison Jr. and UK's Ministry of Defence Head of Indo-Pacific Amy Senior met in Makato City on Thursday, August 27, for the first round of formal negotiations for the proposed Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA). Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | August 28, 2026

MANILA — The Philippines and the United Kingdom have started formal negotiations for a status of visiting forces agreement, allowing British troops to hold drills in the country.

Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Salvador Melchor Mison Jr, defense undersecretary for acquisition and resource management, met with Amy Senior, UK’s head of Indo-Pacific at the British defense ministry, to discuss a possible framework agreement to allow military exercises and training in both countries.

The negotiations reaffirmed the two nations’ commitment to “bolstering cross-regional defense cooperation and upholding rules-based international order,” a statement issued by the defense department said.

“We appreciate the UK’s unqualified support as a like-minded partner in upholding the rules-based international order and preserving freedoms ensured by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),” said Mison.

Mison said the negotiations also “affirmed the Philippines-UK relations while upholding rules-based order in response to the emerging complex security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.”

The discussions focused on “enhancing strategic initiatives and interoperability” between the two armed forces, highlighting “mutual commitment for regional peace and security through the rule of law.”

Mison also underscored the “ever-growing” partnership between the Philippines and the UK in defense relations and cooperation.

UK could be the second European power to enter into a status of forces deal with the Philippines after France. Germany and the Netherlands are also interested in signing a similar military arrangement.

Philippines has similar military agreements with several like-minded nations, including the United States. Philippines and the US signed the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998.

Philippines also has SOVFAs with Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan.

Recently-confirmed Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Antonio Nafarrete with former House Deputy Speaker and AFP reserve officer Michael Romero at the House of Representatives last August 13, 2026. Photo from Romero’s office.

COL Dencio S. Acop (Ret), PhD, CPP | August 26, 2026

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS — Soon after I saw that photo of Michael Romero with Philippine Armed Forces Chief General Antonio Nafarrete, combined feelings of disgust and anger quickly filled me. Both men were in formal military uniform as it was the confirmation of newly promoted senior officers by the Commission on Appointments. But the nine layers of awards and decorations on one chest versus the eight layers of the same on the other just beside it told a starkly different story. For one was true, but the other wasn’t. The one with the nine layers also had a total of twelve wings and badges while the other only had nine.

For a moment there, I thought I was looking at a pseudo real photo enhanced by AI. Then, I realized it was a real photo. How could it be? How can a part-time, reservist officer with the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command, have more service medals and decorations than the Chief of Staff who spent more than thirty years of active-duty, full-time military service as a regular army career officer? If I had never served in the military myself, I probably would have left the issue alone at that. But the problem is that I too had served. And, therefore, I know the truth versus the fake when it comes to these things in the military, especially in the Philippines. (Also read: Character Leadership Matters: West Point and My Leadership Journey)

I also couldn’t move past it without giving due justice to all the men and women of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who’ve truly earned such tokens of recognition and promotions falsely claimed by Romero. Many of these men and women dearly paid the ultimate sacrifice for their country and only these men and women of such caliber deserve the honor. Certainly not Romero and his kind. I will never allow him to dishonor the noble profession of arms by his thick-faced conduct just because he is a billionaire who thinks that everything can be bought.

If Romero truly wants to be deserving of the honors he claims just for his own ego, I will challenge him to emulate the deeds of Lieutenant General Arturo Ortiz, a Medal of Valor Awardee I truly admire. I have just written about him too. I will advise Romero to go and earn them, especially his combat awards.

Shameless as Romero is, he went around wearing the most medals, wings, and badges as if having the superlative number of these made the wearer a winner. Never mind that most of them are undeserved or outright fake. Ortiz himself has fewer layers. I have six, including my Distinguished Conduct Star.

Truth is that the issue at stake here is not so much about the narcissistic ego of one dysfunctional individual more than the irreparable damage such spectacle has caused the morale and welfare of the men and women of our armed forces and its impact upon the effectiveness and efficiency of the AFP as a fighting machine. Especially during these times.

Awards, decorations, wings, and badges on a military uniform are not mere “decorations” as those displayed in houses or halls. If they were, they would have had no meaning. The one word that characterizes each one of those attachments to the uniform is HONOR. And it is the one word that escapes Romero, and all pretenders like him, in its sublimest sense. Let us scrutinize the claimed awards and decorations of this usurper.

If one bears with me, the awards displayed on his undeserving chest are: Gold Cross, Silver Cross, Bronze Cross, Distinguished Aviation Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, Luzon Campaign, Visayas Campaign, Mindanao Campaign, Gawad sa Kapayapaan, Meritorious Achievement Medal, CSAFP Commendation Medal, Gawad sa Kaunlaran, Silver Wing, Military Merit Medal, Sagisag ng Ulirang Kawal, Military Civic Action Medal, Parangal sa Kapanalig ng SLP, PSG Ribbon, Anti-Dissidence Campaign Ribbon, Military Commendation Medal, KIG Ribbon, and Disaster-Rehabilitation-Relief Ribbon.

Many of Romero’s medals and ribbons even have appurtenances attached to them. This means that he has supposedly “earned” each one not just once but repeatedly. To justify his awards, what are enumerated on his statement of service in the AFP Reserve Force are the following. First, he co-authored the 2018 AFP Salary Standardization Measures. Second, as deputy speaker in 2021, he facilitated the acquisition of three C-130’s for the Philippine Air Force.

What he has done as a congressman deserves no medal though from the AFP because it is his ordinary duty as a party-list representative to formulate public policy. Third, he had been involved, not necessarily personally, in more than 60 civil-military operations and humanitarian assistance (medical/dental) missions, including disaster relief. Such missions reached as far as Pag-asa Island, Batanes, Basilan, Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga, and North Cotabato.

With this list of achievements, the only awards and decorations which would qualify as truly “earned” by Romero would be the Military Civic Action Medal, Gawad sa Kaunlaran, Parangal sa Kapanalig ng SLP, Military Commendation Medal, and Disaster-Rehabilitation-Relief Ribbon. With this number of medals, Romero’s chest would bear no more than two layers, which is more like it.

Romero would not have qualified for the combat awards like the Gold Cross and Distinguished Aviation Cross because he has never seen direct action against the enemy. He would also not have qualified even for the campaign ribbons throughout the archipelago, including the Anti-Dissidence Campaign Medal and Ribbon, because he has not been assigned full-time in any combat area in either Luzon, Visayas, or Mindanao for at least six months.

How did he get a PSG Ribbon when he was never assigned to the Presidential Security Group, a full-time, active-duty assignment? The rest of the awards he claims to have been given to him, other than those I have already refuted, are awards and decorations normally given to active-duty members of the AFP because of their meritorious actions against the enemy above and beyond the call of duty.

How can a reservist, who is not full-time and not having been directly engaged in actions against the enemy, have been awarded the honors he proudly wears on his uniform chest? The same goes with the wings and badges he claims to have won.

How did he earn a GSC badge when he only attended twice at the AFP Command and General Staff College? A classmate of his volunteered the information that he only attended when the class had a “boodle fight” and when there was a VIP who visited.

The same is true with his alleged other courses where he would only show up once or twice and yet, he was allowed to graduate from these courses justifying his promotion up the ladder. How can he have combat wings when he never saw combat of any kind? Normally, earning wings necessitates reaching a certain number of combat jumps or sorties before being awarded such.

Through it all, why would he even be willing to receive such awards if he knew he didn’t deserve them? More importantly, who are the individuals or offices within the Department of National Defense-Armed Forces of the Philippines who gave him these undeserved honors and why?

If a great disservice is perpetrated, it is usually the people at the higher echelons of organizations who are chiefly responsible and accountable. Ideally, there is nothing that goes on within institutions and organizations which escapes the people in charge of these organizations.

It is almost impossible for rank-and-file, much more external people, to pull off a caper of such magnitude as Romero had done without enablers in the institutions he has had to deal with in accumulating the fake medals and badges, he managed to acquire within just a brief period of five years. The chances of him pulling it off alone or by just scheming with low-level clerks are highly unlikely or even impossible!

More significantly, it is even a greater disservice for active-duty soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines to be bypassed by honors they rightfully deserve by their actions in the field while they witness an undeserving reservist flout his undeserved medals right in their faces through social media.

In their minds, they cannot help wondering about the double standards that seem to characterize their administrative operating environment even as they are mandated to perform the difficult task, often at the risk of life and limb, of securing the national territory and of protecting national sovereignty at all costs. Through all the episodes of corruption going on affecting key government institutions, it wouldn’t be too far from their consciousness to wonder if the fact that Romero is a billionaire and former congressman had something to do with this brazen spectacle.

Already, there are murmurings to the effect that a presidential wannabe in the 2028 national elections is allegedly courting the support of potential campaign contributor Romero in exchange for the usual mutual favors. By any means, the cat is already out of the bag through the public exposes on Romero’s excessive indiscretions enabled by powerful individuals in the defense establishment. Romero’s resignation does not exculpate him from violations of law and regulations he must now be made to answer to. In fact, if he did not violate anything, then why did he resign in the first place? Is his resignation a face-saving measure?

Now, it behooves the DND-AFP to get to the bottom of this latest scandal affecting no less than a tradition of honor that glues the military psyche together motivating its members to keep fighting even an uphill battle to preserve the nation and achieve a greater good beyond themselves for all of us. In this regard, the nation needs its military — officers and men — now more than ever as the country is threatened by an external aggressor not seen since World War II.

Now is not the time to demoralize our fighting men and women in uniform through allowing usurpation of the one intangible thing that keeps them together and reliable in times of actual war – HONOR.

File photo from the Philippine Coast Guard on June 30, 2023 showed a Chinese Coast Guard vessel maneuvering close to patrol ship BRP Malabrigo near Ayungin Shoal in the West Philippine Sea.

Rommel C. Banlaoi | August 26, 2026

A month after the Philippines commemorated the tenth anniversary of the Arbitral Award, it remains the benchmark of Manila’s sovereign assertion. But it also exposes the limits of international law in restraining great power behavior, as Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea continue unabated.

The verbal clash between the Department of National Defense and the Chinese Embassy in Manila is complicating the current situation. China’s ban on Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro is a concrete signal that defense cooperation has collapsed. Military dialogue is frozen, and the Philippine defense attaché in Beijing has been recalled. (Also read: Philippines condemns “actions” against Filipinos in China)

Teodoro’s blunt characterization of China’s reported immigration action against more than 100 Filipinos as “plain and simple extortion and blackmail” has further poisoned the atmosphere, prompting sharp counterattacks from Beijing.(Also read: Teodoro accuses China of “interference” in Philippine affairs)

What remains is a dangerous vacuum in defense relations. With dialogue suspended and rhetoric escalating, the risk of miscalculation in contested waters is rising.

From the lens of pragmatic nationalism, this inconvenient reality is untenable. Advancing national interest requires both the protection of sovereign rights and the management of disputes through practical engagement. Without reliable defense channels, Manila’s security is undermined and its diplomatic maneuverability constrained.

Pragmatic nationalism insists that sovereignty must be defended, but also that engagement with China is necessary to safeguard Philippine interests and regional stability.

Resuming the Annual Defense and Security Talks

The Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) provides political dialogue, but it cannot substitute for defensespecific engagement. Reviving the Annual Defense and Security Talks (ADST) is therefore a pragmatic step to rebuild confidence, restore cooperation, and advance preventive diplomacy.

Established under the 2004 Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, the ADST was designed to address not only maritime disputes but also broader regional security concerns. Early rounds produced tangible gains: naval encounter protocols, humanitarian and disaster relief exercises, and informationsharing on piracy, terrorism, and cybercrime. These outcomes demonstrated that structured dialogue can deliver stability even amid unresolved sovereignty issues.

Suspending the ADST, however, removed the only mechanism tailored to prevent miscalculation at sea. Its restoration is a calculated safeguard of Philippine interests.

Stabilizing Ties Through Pragmatic Engagement

A decade after arbitration, the absence of sustained defense dialogue magnifies risks. Restoring the ADST would stabilize bilateral ties and reassure Southeast Asia that both nations remain committed to responsible dispute management. (Also read: Marcos defends two-year deal with China on Ayungin)

For Manila, resuming the ADST embodies pragmatic nationalism: defending sovereign rights while keeping channels open to reduce risks. For Beijing, it signals willingness to act as a responsible regional power. The ADST fills the operational gap left by the BCM, providing a structured platform for defensespecific exchanges on rules of engagement, crisis management, and escalation avoidance.

Pragmatic nationalism does not require abandoning national positions. It requires recognizing that miscalculation is a shared danger, and that regular defensefocused communication is the most effective safeguard against it.

Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance

Reviving the ADST offers more than risk reduction. It opens space for maritime cooperation and ocean governance where collaboration can yield mutual gains in fisheries management, marine protection, scientific research, maritime safety, and energy security. These practical projects are achievable regardless of sovereignty disputes and directly advance Philippine interests.

The ADST can complement the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) by linking bilateral initiatives with regional frameworks. As 2026 ASEAN Chair, the Philippines can align ADMM+ priorities with the ADST, embedding bilateral confidencebuilding within ASEAN’s collective security architecture. This synergy strengthens Manila’s strategic role in shaping cooperative maritime management while ensuring that pragmatic engagement serves national and regional stability.

Conclusion

Pragmatic nationalism demands that the Philippines and China reconvene the ADST. It is imperative or either side to take the initiative. But Manila has the most to gain from restoring defense dialogue as a hedge against escalation and a platform for cooperation. (Also read: Building Bridges Not Walls: The Philippines and the Future of Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific)

Such a move would signal to the wider region that both nations are committed not only to asserting their positions but also to managing disputes responsibly. Reviving defense talks can facilitate the transformation of the South China Sea from a flashpoint of military conflict into a domain of peace, stability, and cooperation.

Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD, is Director of the Philippines–China Studies Center at Diliman College and President of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies. He served as President of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies.

The Royal Australian Navy supply ship HMAS Supply (A195) participated in the 19th multilateral maritime cooperative activity last August 19-25, 2026 within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. Photo from US Pacific Command.

Manuel Mogato | August 26, 2026

MANILA — The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) joined the Philippine Navy in another multilateral maritime cooperative activity (MMCA) in the West Philippine Sea, the 19th iteration since 2024.

A military spokesman, Colonel Xerxes Trinidad, said the one-week activity enhanced maritime interoperability and operational coordination among the participating forces through a series of complex maritime and air operations designed to strengthen their capability to operate seamlessly together in support for a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific. (Also read: No scaling down in joint exercises with the US — Philippines)

He sad the Philippines deployed the BRP Diego Silang (FFG7), a Philippine Navy AW109 helicopter, Philippine Air Force FA-50 fighter aircrafts, C-208B aircraft, and Sokol Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopter.

The Philippine Coast Guard also participated through the deployment of BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701), he added.

For the United States, it sent USS Santa Barbara (LCS-32) and P-8A Poseidon aircraft, while Australia deployed HMAS Supply (A-195), along with MH-60R helicopter and P-8A aircraft. (Also read: What’s the reason behind US expansion of military engagements in the Philippines?)

Throughout the activity, participating the three navies conducted advanced maritime interoperability exercises, including Communications Exercises (COMMEX), Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Replenishment at Sea (RAS), Division Tactics (DIVTACS) / Officer of the Watch (OOW) Maneuvers, Photo Exercise (PHOTOEX) and fly-by operations.

“The successful completion of the 19th MMCA underscores the enduring commitment of the Philippines, the United States, and Australia to strengthening defense cooperation, enhancing interoperability, and promoting peace, stability, and security in the Indo-Pacific region,” Trinidad said.

US President Donald Trump salutes before the caskets of U.S. soldiers killed in the Middle East, last July 22, 2026, at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | August 25, 2026

MANILA — US President Donald Trump has made unreasonable demands to security allies and partners as the war with Iran drags on without clear strategic results.

Determined to bring Iran to its knees, Trump has stepped up pressure on both his perceived “enemies” and “allies.”

Trump also began “punishing” allies and partners that refused to help the United States in confronting Iran, making “enemies” of middle power states that used to support Washington’s engagements.

For instance, it slapped a 50 percent tariff on exports from its northern neighbor, forcing Canada to retaliate with $20 billion counter-tariff on American goods, such as steel and dairy products.

In other parts of the world, Trump was using the nuke card to scare allies.

Facing real nuclear weapons threats from the north, South Korea was forced to rely on its own defense posture after Trump redeployed the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile from the Korean peninsula to the Middle East.

Early this month, Trump scaled down annual joint military drills with Seoul after its leader declined to help Washington confront Tehran.

Trump’s transactional leadership has forced allies and partners to reassess engagements with the United States. (Also read: “Middle Powers” rise as doubts of US reliability deepen)

For instance, these allies resented Washington’s meddling in their domestic policies, particularly when the US pushes its allies to spend more on national defense and security.

For instance, Washington’s national security officials have been pressuring European and Asian allies and partners to raise defense spending to 3 percent of GDP to share the burden in deterrence. (Also read: Rubio wants Asian states to send ships to protect the Strait of Hormuz)

For most smaller and weaker states, increasing defense spending would be a burden because meager resources compete directly with social development programs, such as health, education, and other poverty alleviation projects.

For instance, the Philippines’ defense spending for 2027 was only a little over 1 percent of its GDP, making it difficult to modernize its defense capabilities. Defense spending was projected to grow by 7 percent to 328 billion pesos in 2027.

The Philippines would need at least 100 billion pesos a year to meet its target of building a minimum defense capability in 10 years

With that budget, it would not be enough for the Philippines to spend on expensive US weapon systems to boost its deterrence capabilities.

No one is willing to pay for expensive US weapons systems if American defense suppliers cannot deliver on schedule.

The Australians must be frustrated that they discarded the French contract for the American nuclear-powered sub-surface vessels under a trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership because the submarine project faces delays.

Trump may have miscalculated the United States’ capacity to build weapons as fast as it can, given the amount of missiles it has used in the war with Iran as well as the support it has been giving to Ukraine.

At the current stage, the US defense industry has serious problems with the export of its defense products due to limited production capacities and weakening cooperation with European allies and Israel. (Also read: Drones & chokepoints: Lessons for PH from Ukraine, Iran)

Washington’s “Operation Epic Fury” was an epic failure, clearly demonstrating the deficiency in how to wage a war with a middle power, like Iran.

Its expensive and advanced weaponry seems vulnerable to cheaper Iranian drones and missiles.

In the first two months of “Operation Epic Fury”, the US expended thousands of missiles and munitions that could take years to reproduce, bleeding the Pentagon of at least $25 billion.

Moreover, the US military lost several aircraft, such as F-35A, F-15E, KC-135, E-3, A-10, MC-130J, helicopters, and an MQ-9A Reaper drone.

Its bases in the Middle East were vulnerable too to Iranian missiles and drones, and about a dozen US soldiers had died.

US defense industries are losing customers, and many allies and partners have started reviewing cooperative arrangements with Washington.

The conflict in Ukraine and Iran has created demand for weapons systems and equipment, especially for Israel and Ukraine.

However, American and European industrial bases are becoming exhausted due to prolonged conflicts, as production has slowed amid rapid use on the front lines.

With US missiles and munitions depleted and production falling behind, US military dominance is in doubt.

Trump’s actions against both “enemies” and “allies” are not helping Washington’s cause in ending the war in Iran.