President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. meets with the Filipino community in Japan during his second state visit last month. Official handout.

COL Dencio S. Acop (Ret), PhD, CPP | June 8, 2026

Our efforts at resolving problems are stifled by our own sins and crimes that, due to selfish motives, only result in palliative solutions to show the people that mandated problem-solvers or the government are doing something to correct problems on behalf of the people, but in truth, are also covering-up for their own misdeeds violating the law.

This type of dynamics has encouraged pragmatism but discouraged idealism. The idealists, who join government in order to truly serve the public interest, which is really just the common good, get pushed to the sidelines when powerful interests from the moneyed members of society, or mob-like behavior from the masses, take the upper-hand in the process of resolving problems of public interest.

In this type of environment, ultimately it is the pragmatists who possess the wherewithal to survive in public service more than the idealists, because they can navigate through the gray areas between what are considered to be moral values and those that violate these, and still survive it.

While this situation can build careers for these types of individuals, it also lays a heavy cost on the larger public interest where the most serious problems affecting the common good and the greatest number of people like the poor and marginalized, are set aside in favor of much narrower, private, and individual interests.

Take the case of what’s happening in the Philippines right now. While a regional power like China is encroaching upon Philippine territory and exclusive economic zone to harvest natural resources for its billion of people and advance military and defense interest in its quest to invade Taiwan, pro-China senators and China-backed “Die-hard Duterte Supporters” are causing problems for the government of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. both for their personal interests and those of the Chinese Communist Party.

While these entities may argue this observation, the fact remains that only China and its interests are ultimately benefited by their bizarre behavior. How can the greater national interest of the Philippines advance if its senate is non-functioning? (Also read: Philippine Senate standoff ends with new majority bloc)

Doesn’t this advance Chinese interest because the Philippines is unable to adopt a whole-of-nation focus on Chinese incursions in the West Philippine Sea violating Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity and the 2016 Arbitral Ruling declaring such incursions illegal in the eyes of international law? (Also read: Philippines loses bid for a non-permanent seat in the powerful UN Security Council)

Moreover, how can the larger Filipino national interest be advanced by a theoretical second Duterte administration in 2028 when we all know that Rodrigo Duterte, as well as his children in politics including Vice President Sara Duterte, are practically allowing China’s encroachments in Philippine waters violating their oaths of office?

The non-impeachment of the vice president, despite her incompetence and plunderous behavior, would be favorable to the Chinese because she would be their very supportive ally. Finally, how can the non-prosecution of erring senators advance the greater domestic interest of safeguarding the rule of law through an impartial criminal justice system that works for all Filipinos and not just a few powerful local elites?

The propensity of erring senators in using their political powers, entrusted to them by ALL of the people they serve, to escape and evade the long arm of the law is an insult to injury suffered by the Filipino people as a whole. Add to this gaping insult the fact that senators are lawmakers of the upper chambers and we see here the impunity of these individuals who make a historical mockery of the sacred duty of enacting policies for the land of their birth which they had sworn to do with integrity and even the help of Almighty God. (Also read: Self-Serving Criminal Behavior by Senators and the Undermining of a Republic)

Now, if we were President Marcos Jr., what should we do? For theoretical purposes, let’s assume that the situation the president is in is as claimed by his detractors, which is quite normal in politics. (Also read: Authorities checking reports on fresh destabilization attempts against the Marcos government)

Let’s assume his enemies accuse him of merely benefiting from the fact that it is the Dutertes who gave him his position by allowing him to be the president so long as he later supports Sara Duterte as his successor. This is well taken. But it also has a couple of significant loopholes and gaps both subject to legal inquiry.

One is the accusation of “cheating” the last presidential elections. If we may recall, it was Leni Robredo who was in a position to win if the elections were totally honest. Realities on the ground then proved this. But, of course, it was still the administration of Rodrigo Duterte that was in power at the time. Despite overwhelming public support, administration-friendly media outfits and individuals still claimed Robredo fell behind the administration candidate by leaps and bounds.

It was reminiscent of the first Marcos regime in 1985 when increasingly unpopular dictator FM Sr. gave in to public clamor and demand for snap elections to be held. To which the opposition united and fielded the widow of Marcos’ nemesis, Ninoy Aquino. Despite overwhelming public support for Cory Aquino, the Comelec declared FM the unanimous winner and still democratically elected president. Two points apply. One is that cheating in 2022 needs to be proven. Second is that, if Bongbong cheated, then so did Sara. It is an argument that the DDS cannot really advance without hurting their champion and themselves as well.

The second loophole is the alleged involvement of the current President in the billions-worth flood scam anomalies. This is the other reason why DDS Senator Alan Peter Cayetano is conducting that other hearing, which is really out of order, trying to implicate Marcos Jr. in alleged corruption based on the tampered confessions of discredited rogue marines acting as witnessing bag boys.

How can such rogue hearing advance the nation’s interest?

First of all, it is not being conducted in the proper forum. Second of all, Cayetano and his cohorts have already been replaced from their committee chairmanships by other senators so their continuing to conduct the same in parallel is not only redundant, but out of line. (Also read: Self-Serving Criminal Behavior by Senators and the Undermining of a Republic)

If there is an allegation against the President, it must be done legally. There must be a formal accusation and then it must wait until the President’s immunity is lifted. Until then, it must be business as usual especially given the fact that an existential threat in China’s illegal incursions have been staring us in the face for quite some time now and such should, in fact, be the focus of all senators who are loyal to their oaths regardless of political affiliation.

In national situations where chaos and anarchy ruled the land in the face of clear and present danger, commanders-in-chief have historically been forced to use their emergency powers to quell dissent lest their nations fell.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in his commencement speech for the 3rd Commencement Exercises of the West Visayas State University (WVSU) College of Law in Iloilo City last Friday, June 5. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | June 8, 2026

MANILA — The government’s security services have started looking into reports of fresh attempts to unseat President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. after rumors swirled of a massive protest action this week, an administration official said.

Although the Presidential Office’s spokesperson, Claire Castro, dismissed reports of fresh attempts to destabilize the government, security services have intensified their monitoring activities on certain groups, including an influential religious group that reportedly planned to march on June 12. (Also read: Coup jitters not only a headache for Marcos Jr. but also for US, allies)

“There was a raw intelligence report that a religious group, closely identified with the Duterte political group, planned to mobilize a large crowd and march to Malacanang to pressure the president to stop the impeachment of the vice president and arrest lawmakers aligned with her,” an unnamed administration official speaking on condition of anonymity.

The administration official said several of Duterte’s allies had met with two senators and two former lawmakers at a five-star hotel in Bonifacio Global City last week to seek political support for the mass action.

“They could have talked about possible funding for the mass action,” the administration official said. (Also read: The Unlikelihood of a Successful Coup in the Philippines)

“Incidentally, a retired army general created a new group of retired soldiers and policemen to call for a thorough investigation into the billions of pesos worth of non-existent public works projects,” he added.

Senators allied with Vice President Sara Duterte held a public consultation on the non-existent flood control projects, singling out senators and more than a dozen congressmen for receiving suitcases of cash from 2019 to 2025.

“These public consultations were unofficial and were never entered into the Senate records,” he said, adding the proceedings were illegal.

The administration official said the public consultations were meant to discredit some congressmen involved in Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial.

Apart from delaying the impeachment trial, the administration official said the pro-Duterte groups also wanted to pressure the president not to arrest lawmakers involved in the infrastructure mess.

Senators Joel Villanueva, Francis Escudero, Rodante Marcoleta, Robin Padilla and Alan Peter Cayetano may face arrest soon. (Also read: Authorities arrest a senator for corruption)

At the same time, the Armed Forces issued a statement asking the public to insulate the military from partisan politics after vloggers claimed the mass action was supported and endorsed by soldiers.

The Philippine National Police, for its part, said it has not monitored plans and activities to destabilize the government. (Also read: A template for regime change)

“But the security services are not taking any chances,” the administration officials said, adding the National Security Council has started checking the reports.

Ousted Senate President Alan Peter Cayetano approaches Minority Bloc members Senators Panfilo “Ping” Lacson and Vicente “Tito” Sotto III during the plenary session last May 26. Senator Sherwin “Win” Gatchalian became Senate president pro tempore last Wednesday, June 3. Photo by Senate Social Media Unit.

Rommel Banlaoi | June 8, 2026

MANILA — Crisis has once again engulfed the Philippine Senate. The declaration of vacancies in all leadership positions and the installation of Senator Sherwin Gatchalian as acting Senate president, despite Alan Peter Cayetano’s refusal to step down, has thrown the chamber into turmoil. This domestic dispute is a direct challenge to the stability of our democracy and the security of our nation, with implications that reverberate internationally.

The political turmoil deepened during the recent Blue Ribbon Committee hearing, where Cayetano’s bloc defied the suspension of Senate business and proceeded with an inquiry into flood control anomalies. Senator Pia Cayetano presided over the session, administering oaths to 18 former Marines who alleged the delivery of suitcases of cash linked to corrupt projects involving high officials in government. The hearing was conducted without a Senate secretary or stenographers, further underscoring the institutional breakdown and contested authority within the upper chamber. (Also read: Authorities arrest a senator for corruption)

At the core of this dispute lies a constitutional question: what constitutes a legitimate majority?

The Constitution requires thirteen votes to elect or remove a Senate president. Yet the new majority insists quorum can be defined differently, citing the 1949 Avelino v. Cuenco ruling. Such legal gymnastics may serve immediate political interests, but they erode the rule of law. When constitutional provisions are bent to suit factional convenience, institutions lose credibility. When institutions lose credibility, the state itself becomes fragile and allies abroad begin to question the Philippines’ reliability as a democratic partner.

The senate crisis comes at a critical juncture. The Senate is preparing to try the impeachment case against Vice President Sara Duterte. Leadership disputes cast doubt on whether the chamber can conduct the trial with fairness and impartiality. If the impeachment process is perceived as manipulated, public trust will erode further. In a country already weary of political theatrics, this erosion of trust risks fueling instability and delegitimizing the very mechanisms designed to resolve conflict peacefully. For the international community, this raises concerns about the Philippines’ ability to uphold democratic norms and remain a credible voice in regional security dialogues.

From a national security perspective, the implications are serious. The Philippines faces escalating tensions in the West Philippine Sea, persistent insurgencies, and the growing menace of transnational crime. (Also read: Philippines loses bid for a non-permanent seat in the powerful UN Security Council)

A Senate consumed by internal strife cannot provide the legislative oversight and policy direction needed to strengthen national resilience. Political elites must realize that their actions reverberate beyond the halls of Congress. A weakened Senate diminishes the state’s capacity to respond to threats, leaving the nation vulnerable and undermining collective defense arrangements with allies who depend on Manila’s stability.

Malacañang’s recognition of the new majority adds another layer of concern. While executive endorsement may stabilize one faction, it risks compromising the independence of the legislative branch. The separation of powers is the safeguard against authoritarian drift. When the executive openly validates contested leadership in the Senate, the balance of power envisioned by our framers is endangered. For international observers, this signals a dangerous erosion of checks and balances, raising alarms about democratic backsliding.

The implications for political stability are also alarming. If the Senate remains divided, legislative priorities will stall. Economic recovery measures, social welfare programs, and national defense initiatives will be sidelined. The public, already skeptical of political elites, will lose confidence in government’s ability to deliver. This erosion of trust creates fertile ground for populist backlash, further destabilizing the political landscape. International investors may withdraw, and regional allies may question the Philippines’ reliability in joint security efforts.

The Senate must, therefore, resolve its leadership dispute through constitutional means, securing the requisite thirteen votes to establish legitimacy. Senators must recommit to their legislative mandate, placing national interest above factional loyalty. Civil society, the media, and the international community must hold both the Senate and the executive accountable, ensuring that democratic norms are not sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

The Senate has survived crises before during martial law, post-EDSA transitions and various corruption scandals. Its resilience lies in its ability to rise above partisan conflict and serve as a forum for national deliberation.

Today, that resilience is being tested once again. The outcome will determine not only the fate of Vice President Duterte’s impeachment but also the credibility of Philippine democracy itself and its standing in the global community.

The Senate must choose as either to be an arena of partisan strife or a pillar of democratic stability.

If this crisis drags on unresolved, the risks extend far beyond politics. A paralyzed Senate will weaken our ability to respond decisively to pressing challenges in the West Philippine Sea, undermine ongoing counterinsurgency operations, and embolden criminal networks that thrive on institutional dysfunction. The inability to pass legislation, allocate resources, or provide unified oversight leaves critical national security concerns exposed. In short, political instability at the highest levels of government translates directly into national vulnerability, eroding both deterrence and resilience.

Beyond immediate security threats, prolonged paralysis corrodes public trust in democratic institutions. Citizens may grow disillusioned with governance, creating fertile ground for populist movements or extremist groups to exploit frustration. Economic confidence could falter as investors perceive instability, while regional allies may begin to question the Philippines’ reliability in collective defense arrangements. Such doubts can weaken security partnerships, complicate diplomatic negotiations, and diminish Manila’s credibility in multilateral forums.

In this way, the Senate crisis transcends domestic politics: it becomes a systemic challenge that reverberates across defense, diplomacy, and development, undermining the country’s standing in the international community. If the present crisis is not resolved immediately, it could eventually erode the very foundation of our national security, thereby driving our nation to unwanted collapse with consequences that extend far beyond our borders.

Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD, is a political science practitioner, national security advocate and President of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies.

Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro delivering her statement during the UNGA80 General Debate last September 28, 2025. Photo from SFA Lazaro’s X account.

Anna Mogato | June 4, 2026

MANILA — The Philippines failed to get enough votes for the coveted non-permanent seat in the powerful United Nations (UN) Security Council, as Kyrgyzstan was elected to represent Asia.

After four rounds of voting, the United Nations announced the countries that won seats at the UN Security Council, including the Central Asian republic, Kyrgyzstan, which will sit on the council for the first time since joining the world body in 1992.

The other four countries that won seats were Austria, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. All five countries will begin their two-year terms on January 1, 2027.

Nuclear weapons-states, such as China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, imposing sanctions on UN member-states and intervening in conflicts.

In a statement, Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro thanked the international community for their support during the Philippines’ candidacy.

“Our campaign was anchored on our longstanding commitment to peace, dialogue, international law, and cooperation among nations,” Lazaro said.

“These remain principles that the Philippines will continue to uphold and advance in the global community.”

“The Philippines remains committed to working with all nations in pursuing peace, stability, sustainable development, and a rules-based international order,” Lazaro added.

Lazaro also congratulated the Kyrgyz Republic for winning a seat for the Asia-Pacific Group.

The Philippines has long campaigned for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, with the intention of amplifying the interests of the Global South, such as climate change and migration.

Lazaro, in a previous media engagement, said that earning a seat could be an opportunity for the Philippines to champion a rules-based order, especially involving maritime territories.

Senator Sherwin “Win” Gatchalian during his privilege speech last May 13. Gatchalian took over as Senate Pro Tempore, replacing Loren Legarda, and currently serves as acting Senate President after the quorum declared all positions vacant. Photo by Wendell Alinea/Senate Social Media Unit

Manuel Mogato | June 4, 2026

MANILA — The appearance of one senator at the Senate plenary hall ended a standoff after two session days that paralyzed legislative work in the Congress’ upper chamber.

Senator Francis Escudero, who was aligned with Senate President Alan Peter Cayetano, broke away and joined the 11 senators in the minority bloc, shaking the upper chamber’s leadership.

As soon as the session was called to order, a senator stood to move, declaring all positions in the chamber vacant, unseating Cayetano.

Senator Sherwin Gatchalian was nominated Senate President Pro-Tempore, the second-highest position, because only a simple majority of all senators present in the plenary session allowed him to take the position.

Since all positions were declared vacant, he will also serve as acting Senate President until a permanent leader is elected.

Under the law, 13 votes, or a simple majority of all senators elected into office, are needed to elect a Senate President.

Since the new majority bloc has only 12 members, it cannot elect a replacement for Cayetano.

The new majority also named new panel heads for finance, accounts, rules, defense, foreign relations, education, agriculture, and public order.

A new Senate secretary and sergeant-at-arms were also elected, replacing those appointed by Cayetano last month after grabbing the leadership from Senator Vicente Sotto III.

On the day, the lower house voted to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte on corruption and unexplained wealth complaints; the upper house pulled off a coup when Cayetano got 13 votes to topple Sotto. (Also read: Senate convenes as an impeachment court to hold trial to remove or not the vice president)

Eleven remained with Sotto.

Four members from Sotto’s majority blocs switched sides, and a senator, Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, who has gone into hiding for months, showed up at the plenary session to give Cayetano the majority.

Cayetano’s slim majority was reduced to 12-11 when dela Rosa slipped out from the Senate building three days later and went into hiding again after the International Criminal Court confirmed it had issued last year an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity. (Also read: Authorities suspend the head of legislative security as investigation begins on shooting suspect incident)

A former national police chief under former president Rodrigo Duterte, he carried out the war on drugs policy that killed about 6,000 people.

Last week, Cayetano’s majority bloc proposed changing the Senate’s rules to allow lawmakers to participate in debates and vote online, a move rejected by the minority. (Also read: Self-Serving Criminal Behavior by Senators and the Undermining of a Republic)

When the majority moved to vote on the proposal, the minority walked out, forcing the Senate to adjourn the session.

When the session resumed this week, only the 11 minority senators attended the plenary session. The 12 majority senators chose to skip the session without formal notice after Senator Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, a member of the majority bloc, was arrested by the police on corruption charges.

This divided the Senate equally between 11 members each for the majority and minority, respectively. There was an impasse until the session’s second day.

On the last day of the first regular session of the 20th Senate, Escudero’s surprise appearance at the plenary hall ended the impasse, joining the 11 minority senators and tilting the balance to the other side.

The minority side suddenly became the majority, leading to the ouster of Cayetano and his allies from chairmanships of various committees.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. at the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, last Saturday, May 30. Official handout.

Rommel Banlaoi | June 1, 2026

At the recently-concluded Shangri-La Dialogue, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s commendation of the Philippines for its defense “burden-sharing” must be read as a strategic signal. Washington is recalibrating its security posture in Asia, urging allies to move beyond dependency and embrace co-responsibility. For Manila, this is a recognition of its growing relevance in the Indo-Pacific chessboard, where the Philippines is no longer viewed as a passive recipient of American protection but as an active contributor to regional stability. (Also read: US, Philippines agree to strengthen deterrence in the region)

Yet this empowerment carries inherent dilemma. Greater responsibility means Manila must brace for sharper exposure to geopolitical friction, especially amid intensifying US-China rivalry. The Philippines is being asked to step into a role that demands both courage and caution—leveraging its alliance with Washington while safeguarding its national interests. This represents the paradox of Philippine security: empowerment through security partnership, but vulnerability through geopolitical entanglement.

A Stronger Security Posture

The Philippines’ decision to boost its defense budget and expand Balikatan exercises with likeminded partners signals a long overdue shift toward external defense. For decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remained focused on counterinsurgency operations at home. Today, however, modernization efforts, ranging from enhanced naval patrols and new air defense systems to joint drills with US forces, are explicitly designed to counter Chinese activities in the West Philippine Sea. (Also read: RECAP: Exercise Balikatan 2026)

This is a welcome development. A credible national defense posture strengthens sovereignty and signals to Beijing that Manila is no longer a passive claimant but an active defender of its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. It also reassures the Filipino people and regional partners that the country is committed to safeguarding its future.

Implications for South China Sea Stability

Yet, burden-sharing has wider consequences for regional stability. The South China Sea is already a contested maritime theater, where overlapping claims and military maneuvers create a volatile environment. By deepening defense cooperation with the US, Manila contributes to a more militarized balance of power in Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region. (Also read: South China Sea Must Avoid Becoming Hormuz)

This can cut both ways. On one hand, stronger Philippine capabilities may discourage Chinese coercion, reducing the likelihood of unilateral actions. On the other, it raises the risk of miscalculation where routine patrols or exercises could spiral into confrontation. Stability in the South China Sea will depend on whether deterrence is matched by dialogue.

The China Factor

China perceives the intensification of US-Philippine defense cooperation as a deliberate component of Washington’s containment strategy. Expanded American access to Philippine bases and the conduct of larger joint military exercises are interpreted in Beijing not merely as deterrence measures, but as direct provocations that heighten the risk of miscalculation. In this context, every incremental step toward strengthening deterrence simultaneously carries the potential to escalate tensions in the region. (Also read: The US to help set up industrial hub in the Philippines)

At the same time, China remains the Philippines’ foremost trading partner, anchoring Manila’s economic growth through investments and trade flows. The possibility of economic retaliation whether in the form of slowed investments or restrictive trade measures cannot be dismissed.

Thus, the Philippines faces a strategic dilemma: it must assert its sovereignty and safeguard national security, while carefully avoiding actions that could trigger punitive responses capable of undermining its economic stability. Navigating this tightrope requires a nuanced balancing of security imperatives with economic realities.

The Need for Balance and Independence

The Philippines cannot afford to lean too heavily on either Washington or Beijing. Over dependence on the US risks entanglement in great power rivalry, while excessive accommodation of China can undermine Philippine sovereignty. The strategic imperative, therefore, is balance: strengthening defense ties with the US while maintaining constructive engagement with China.

But balance alone is not enough. Manila must assert an independent foreign policy that prioritizes Philippine national interests above the agendas of external powers. Defense modernization must be pursued not as a proxy for US strategy, but as a sovereign choice to protect Philippine territory. Engagement with China must be calibrated, advancing peace and stability without compromising sovereignty.

Reviving the Self-Reliant Defense Posture

To attain genuine strategic autonomy, the Philippines must revisit and reinvigorate its Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) program. Conceived to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers, the SRDP remains a vital framework for cultivating indigenous defense capabilities. Revitalizing this program can stimulate local defense industries, foster innovation, and strengthen the country’s technological base.

By investing in the domestic production of naval vessels, aircraft, surveillance systems, and other critical platforms, the Philippines can gradually diminish its reliance on external powers. Such investments not only enhance national defense but also ensure that defense modernization is sustainable, cost-effective, and aligned with national priorities.

True strategic autonomy requires that Manila’s defense posture be anchored in self-reliance, while still engaging in cooperative security arrangements with allies and partners. In this way, the Philippines can balance external collaboration with internal strength and can build a defense ecosystem that is resilient, adaptive, and firmly rooted in national sovereignty.

Conclusion

Hegseth’s commendation underscores Manila’s growing maturity in defense affairs. Yet it also serves as a reminder that sovereignty is inseparable from responsibility and risk. For the Philippines, burden-sharing must be embraced not as a march toward confrontation, but as a strategy to safeguard peace. At the same time, diplomatic agility remains essential to ensure the South China Sea does not become the next flashpoint in great power rivalry.

In the end, Manila’s gargantuan challenge is to integrate defense and diplomacy within a coherent national strategy: strengthen territorial defense, pursue an independent foreign policy, and institutionalize the revival of the SRDP program as a pillar of military modernization. Achieving these objectives is essential for the Philippines to secure a genuine strategic autonomy safeguarding sovereignty while balancing relations with both Washington and Beijing.

Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD, is the Director of the Philippines-China Studies Center at Diliman College and President of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies.

File photo of a Chinese Coast Guard vessel in Bajo de Masinloc. Photo from Philippine Coast Guard.

Manuel Mogato | June 2, 2026

MANILA — The Philippines has been looking into “raw” reports that China has built a structure on Bajo de Masinloc, a clear violation of an informal code of conduct signed in 2002 in Cambodia, Manila’s defense secretary said.

Gilberto Teodoro Jr. said the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine Coast Guard have sent patrols to check on the latest developments after satellite images showed a structure near the mouth of the shoal. (Also read: China blocks Bajo de Masinloc with floating barriers)

“There is raw information and, as I have always said, Bajo de Masinloc is a dynamic area,” Teodoro told journalists at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

“So even if the developments are still small, these are already being monitored.”

Under Article 5 of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, claimant states are prohibited from occupying uninhabited features and building structures on features. (Also read: Philippines rejects China’s protest on construction activities in South China Sea)

“These are raw information; we are still checking,” Teodoro said.

The military only reported that Chinese military and coast guard vessels continued to have a presence within the country’s maritime zones, with about 36 Chinese vessels operating in four key areas.

Of the total, 19 vessels, composed of 10 People’s Liberation Army Navy warships and nine China Coast Guard vessels, were monitored near Bajo de Masinloc.

The remaining vessels were spotted near Ayungin Shoal, Escoda Shoal and Pag-asa Island.

Retired Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad, a government spokesman, said the sustained presence of Chinese vessels is part of Beijing’s strategy. (Also read: Philippines rejects China’s sovereignty claim on West Philippine Sea)

“The presence in Bajo de Masinloc is there to normalize the situation as they have already declared a nature reserve,” Trinidad said.

“These are all illegal statements; these are false narratives which we have been pushing back against. Rest assured, the AFP will continue monitoring the situation and performing our actions of patrolling the seas and flying the skies,” he said.

Trinidad said China has maintained a constant presence in the disputed waters. “We do not speculate on their presence, or why they are there. What is important is that their presence is still illegal,” he said.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister H.E. Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow during the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Official handout.

Prapapoom Eiamsom | June 2, 2026

BANGKOK — On the sidelines of last May’s BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi, Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow held critical bilateral talks with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.

The primary focus of the meeting was the persistent reality: the long-delayed India–Myanmar–Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway, intended to link South Asia to Southeast Asia, remains frozen due to the civil unrest in Myanmar.

The ambitious 1,360-kilometre highway—designed to stretch from Moreh in northeastern India through Myanmar to Mae Sot in Thailand—serves as the foundational anchor for New Delhi’s “Act East” policy.

First proposed in 2002 under the “Look East” framework, the corridor was engineered to lift India’s landlocked northeastern states out of geographic isolation, transforming them into an economic gateway to the broader Asia-Pacific. However, because of the intensifying internal conflict following Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, operational targets have repeatedly slipped, with current projections drifting toward 2027.

While both New Delhi and Bangkok have expressed readiness to finalise infrastructural investments, the political unrest in Myanmar has brought physical connectivity to a standstill. (Also read: Securing China’s ‘front door’: Peacemaking mission in mainland Southeast Asia)

In an interview following the bilateral talks, Sihasak said, while Thailand is ready and India remains committed to the project, the ongoing instability in Myanmar is an unyielding bottleneck. (Also read: Philippine Statement on the transfer of Daw Ang Suu Kyi to house arrest)

To overcome the institutional paralysis within ASEAN’s traditional diplomatic channels, New Delhi and Bangkok are leaning toward targeted mini-lateral frameworks.

During their meetings, India proposed a subsequent round of the Six-Country Informal Consultation on Myanmar, which brings together Thailand, Laos, Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar.

This tracking group, first convened in Bangkok in December 2024, operates as a pragmatic mechanism to address immediate, cross-border security concerns that larger bureaucratic structures have failed to resolve.

The security consultations focus primarily on securing shared frontiers against shifting territorial control by ethnic armed organisations, coordinating crackdowns on cyber-scam networks and human trafficking rings proliferating in lawless border zones, and crafting local, issue-based peace efforts to complement stalled regional initiatives.

With India assuming the chair for the upcoming consultations, Thailand has voiced full support for New Delhi’s leadership.

Thailand’s current diplomatic strategy toward Myanmar is characterised as a calibrated re-engagement.

This pragmatic policy acknowledges that isolation has failed to yield stability; instead, Thailand seeks to maintain direct communication with all active factions to secure its immediate economic borders and handle mounting humanitarian pressures.

For Thailand, the IMT highway is not merely a trade route but a strategic vehicle to realise its long-term ambition of becoming mainland Southeast Asia’s primary logistics hub.

Positioned at the geographic heart of the region, Bangkok aims to be the seamless link to India’s industrial capacity, with Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) and the neighbouring markets of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.

By establishing a direct overland alternative, Thailand seeks to bypass the heavily congested and narrow Strait of Malacca, which has historically concentrated maritime wealth in Malaysia and Singapore.

The economic dividends for Bangkok are substantial, providing an overland export pipeline for Thai automotive components, electronics, and agricultural products directly to India’s rapidly expanding middle class.

Crucially, this opens up a vital channel to diversify trade and balance Thailand’s heavy economic reliance on China.

For India, the stakes are equally high. Economically, regional connectivity with ASEAN is projected to unlock more than $70 billion in incremental regional GDP. (Also read: Vietnam seals $700 million Brahmos deal with India)

Strategically, the highway provides an essential counterweight to China’s expanding footprint in Southeast Asia.

Access to Myanmar’s domestic energy markets would help India in diversifying its oil and natural gas imports away from the volatile Middle East. Ultimately, the consensus from the New Delhi meetings indicates that India cannot truly “Act East,” and Thailand cannot fully secure its logistics future, until a durable peace is restored to the fractured state that lies between them.

Manuel Mogato | June 1, 2026

Last week, a bit of good news from the Middle East prompted global oil prices to fall.

In the Philippines, pump prices are expected to be rolled back after five weeks of steady increases, a welcome respite for consumers.

What is the reason for the lower global oil prices? There were reports that the United States and Iran are close to a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz after months of intense conflict in the Middle East.

The deal could allow super tankers to pass through the narrow strait and deliver crude oil and other petroleum products from Gulf States and Kuwait to the rest of the world.

Wait, stop popping the champagne bottles.

The war in Iran is not over yet.

In fact, the United States continued to bomb targets in southern Iran, and the Islamic Republic is expected to retaliate in the Gulf states, targeting military facilities used by the Americans.

Thus, the search for cheaper, more reliable, and steady alternative oil supply continues for most states in Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines. (Also read: South China Sea Must Avoid Becoming Hormuz)

Among Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines has one of the thinnest oil reserves. Any slight movement in global oil prices pushes domestic pump prices higher, accelerates inflation, and lowers the economic growth rate. (Also read: Russian oil could save the Philippines’ supply woes)

It is the most vulnerable to the volatile oil markets.

Manila has been struggling to find a reliable source of cheaper oil alternatives. It has asked neighbors, such as South Korea and Japan, as well as the United States and Canada, to supply the country with its energy requirements.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has secured a deal with Japanese investors to help build fuel reserves in Manila after his four-day state visit to Tokyo.

This may take time, and resources are needed to put up a regional oil reserve.

The Philippines needed immediate relief.

Thus, the Philippines was even forced to purchase crude oil from the Russian Far East after the privately run petroleum company Petron lost 4 million barrels of deliveries from the Middle East in late February and early March this year.

There is still uncertainty about whether the arrangement with Russia would continue after the month-long waiver extension issued by the United States expired on May 16.

The United States and its Western allies had imposed strict sanctions on Russia’s oil industry, preventing it from exporting, except to China, India, and its own allies.

In October 2025, Europe joined the fray. It also imposed a package of sanctions against Russia, banned imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) starting in 2027, and tougher restrictions on the “shadow fleet”.

This could target crude and petroleum products already on floating tankers. This is where smaller states get their supply under a two-month waiver allowed by the United States.

Washington is preventing Moscow from earning millions of petrodollars to finance its conflict in Ukraine.

Kyiv has also been attacking Moscow’s oil fields in the Black and Baltic Seas, damaging and lowering its production.

Beijing and New Delhi ignored the sanctions and continued to import oil from Moscow, taking advantage of cheaper Russian oil.

The delivery time was also faster due to proximity to Russia.

Washington was forced to relax the flow of oil supply from Moscow to stabilize global supply and prices.

For instance, the United States issued waivers for the sale of Russian crude already loaded on tankers.

The waiver ended last month, and Southeast Asian countries, again, began scrambling for alternative supplies. (Also read: Viable alternative to Middle East oil)

An opportunity has presented itself in mid-June when all 11 Southeast Asian leaders gather in the Russian city of Kazan, where the 35th anniversary of the Russia-ASEAN dialogue partnership will be held.

It will be the best time to discuss energy security as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam are seeking oil supply deals with Russia.

ASEAN could also ask the United States to issue another waiver, a second extension, to get access to Russian crude oil already loaded onto tankers.

As chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines should take a lead in finding solutions to the global oil shock.

There are other international platforms, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Asia-Europe Summit (EAS), and the United Nations (UN), where the Philippines can play a lead role in ending oil sanctions on Russia and ensuring a steady supply.

Washington could not effectively control global oil trading. Moscow continues to sell its petroleum products to China and India at lower prices, undermining Western competitors.

It should allow oil-thirsty, smaller states to source their supply freely and not be dependent on predatory prices from the United States and the West as an alternative to the Middle East.

Washington’s sanctions penalize smaller countries, like the Philippines. It should end the sanctions now if it wants to stabilize global oil supply and prices.

Senator Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada | Photo by Joseph Vidal, Senate Social Media Unit

Manuel Mogato | June 1, 2026

MANILA — Senator Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada surrendered to police authorities after an anti-graft Sandiganbayan court issued an arrest warrant for plunder.

He was committed to the Quezon City jail, joining a former colleague, Ramon “Bong” Revilla Jr., who also faced a similar plunder case involving million-peso flood control projects.

Manuel Bonoan, a former secretary of public works and highways, and three others were also ordered arrested for non-existent public work projects.

“I will defend myself till the end,” Estrada told journalists before leaving the Senate building to turn himself to the police in Camp Crame.

Estrada said he will not seek the Senate’s protective custody and that he will face his cases head on.

This was the third time Estrada faced corruption charges before the anti-graft court.

The first was in early 2000 when his father, former president Joseph Estrada, was charged with accepting bribes from illegal gambling operators and kickbacks from the tobacco taxes.

After 10 years, he was again charged with plunder for millions in pork barrel funds.

He was acquitted on both charges.

His latest case stemmed from kickbacks of more than 500 million in anomalous infrastructure projects..

Last month, another senator evaded arrest after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity.

Three more senators may face arrest for plunder charges.

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | June 1, 2026

SINGAPORE — US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has urged Asian allies to raise their military spending to counter China’s growing power and prevent its dominance in the region.

Speaking at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Hegseth said stronger, more self-reliant allies are key to deterrence. (Also read: US, Philippines agree to strengthen deterrence in the region)

“The era of the United States subsidizing the defense of wealthy nations is over,” Hegseth said. “We need partners, not protectorates. We don’t have a strong alliance unless everyone has skin in the game. No freeloading.”

The US expects its Asian allies and partners to increase defense spending to 3.5% of GDP as it pledged a US$1.5 trillion investment in its military, he added. (Also read: Strengthening the US’ first-island-chain)

Hegseth said allies want stability, not escalation.

“What they want, and what the United States delivers, is strength that is disciplined, resolve that is steady, and leadership that is confident enough to speak and walk softly while carrying a big stick.”

US President Donald Trump has demanded that allies in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific regions boost defense spending and reduce reliance on Washington. (Also read: The Philippines: a new laboratory for US cutting-edge missiles and drones)

Reacting to Hegseth’s speech, the Malaysian defense minister said Kuala Lumpur will not rush to increase its defense budget.

“It doesn’t mean that we will implement it immediately because America says so,” Khaled Nordin, said in an interview on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue on Saturday.

“Our budget needs to be allocated to various sectors because we are not a developed nation.”

He said Malaysia has been pursuing asymmetrical warfare capabilities, focusing on low-cost, mass-produced weapons like drones and rockets. (Also read: Malaysia protests Norway’s cancellation of missile contract)

Vietnamese President Tô Lâm and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. meet in Malacañang during President To’s first official state visit to the Philippines on Sunday, May 31. Official handout

Anna Mogato | June 1, 2026

MANILA — Southeast Asia’s two fiercest critics of Chinese expansion in the region agreed to raise bilateral relations to an enhanced strategic partnership, ‌reaffirming shared commitment to peace and stability in the South China Sea.

The two Southeast Asian states, both claimants in the South China Sea, also agreed to strengthen joint capabilities in maritime security, disaster risk reduction and management, and military education. (Also read: Vietnam seals $700 million Brahmos deal with India)

In a statement, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said maintaining peace, stability, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea “remains non-negotiable.” (Also read: Friends to all, enemies to no one)

“We stand resolute in our commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, grounded firmly in international law, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award,” Marcos said at a joint press conference with Vietnam’s President Tô Lâm.

Marcos hosted Tô for his first two-day visit to the Philippines since Tô became the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party last year.

In a separate press statement, the two countries said they have agreed “to broaden collaboration in the defense industry and expand cooperation in areas such as military medicine, military logistics, defense trade, search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), maritime and aviation security, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping efforts”.

Both the Philippines and Vietnam bore the brunt of the Chinese illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous actions in the South China Sea. (Also read: South China Sea Must Avoid Becoming Hormuz)

Marcos said closer cooperation with Vietnam would boost deterrence as the two sides were committed to upholding international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Both countries agreed to institutionalize and sustain joint activities between “military services and maritime authorities, exchange of port calls and visits, and joint activities to respond to security issues at sea.”

The Philippines, currently serving as this year’s ASEAN chair, is looking to finalize the signing of the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Vietnam has welcomed the 2016 UNCLOS arbitral tribunal ruling, which had sided with the Philippines. (Also read: ASEAN: Finding relevance in a burning world)

“They further reaffirmed the importance for all parties to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could escalate tension, which in turn could affect peace and stability in the South China Sea,” the statement read.

The statement added that the state leaders agreed to enhance existing maritime cooperation mechanisms and to “resolve maritime incidents through peaceful and amicable means in accordance with international law.”

Marcos and Tô are expected to meet again during the upcoming ASEAN Future Forum 2026 in Ha Noi next week.

State leaders will discuss regional resilience amid the changing geopolitical landscape.

Vietnamese President To Lam greeted by Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai in New Delhi during his first state visit to India. Official handout.

Manuel Mogato | June 1, 2026

HANOI — Vietnam has sealed a $700 million deal to acquire batteries of Brahmos shore-to-ship missiles from India, boosting its coastal defense and anti-access and area denial 9A2AD) capability.

The missile deal was finalized during Vietnam’s President To Lam state visit to India, before traveling to Manila to hold talks with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

Vietnam is the third Southeast Asian country to acquire Brahmos, which includes comprehensive training programs, logistics support, and an initial batch of missiles. (Also read: India’s 2026 diplomatic blitz: EU leaders, Gulf, Quad Summit signal global realignment)

The Philippines and Indonesia have acquired Brahmos missiles.

The sea-skimming BrahMos missile system was jointly developed by India and Russia, making it an effective anti-ship weapon.

Vietnam has stepped up its sea-denial capabilities, worried about China’s expanding naval presence in the South China Sea, where territorial disputes and military activity continue to heighten tensions. (Also read: South China Sea Must Avoid Becoming Hormuz)

During To Lam’s visit, he discussed with Indian officials defense cooperation, maritime security, trade, and regional challenges, with the BrahMos deal as the centerpiece.

The agreement could also pave the way for future expansions, including air- and sea-launched BrahMos variants, thereby deepening Vietnam’s integration into India’s defense ecosystem.

Manuel Mogato | May 31, 2026

MANILA — Conflicts create an illicit weapons market anywhere in the world.

In the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, small arms from Indo-China found their way into the hands of Islamist extremists in the Eastern Indonesia region and Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines.

After the Vietnam War in the 1970s, there was a large surplus of Soviet and American-made assault rifles and handguns in Cambodia and Laos that were smuggled across Southeast Asia.

In the early 2000s, at the height of the Abu Sayyaf Group’s kidnapping spree in Basilan and Sulu, the al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militants displayed to journalists modern and brand-new automatic assault weapons and rifle-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, firing them inside their jungle lairs.

Also in the Philippines, the US military was surprised to discover one of its donated 60mm mortars to the Armed Forces of the Philippines was in the hands of a paramilitary force under a famous Muslim warlord in the central Mindanao region.

The small arms black market also thrives in areas in South Asia, the Middle East, many troubled African states, and, now, in Ukraine.

But more lethal and dangerous weapons are sold in these illegal arms markets — shoulder-fired man-portable air defense (MANPADS) stinger missiles, rifle propelled grenades (RPGs), machine guns, crew-served weapons, bombs, explosives, all sorts of munitions and ordnances, drones, and even armored vehicles and main battle tanks.

This is where international criminal and terrorist groups, such as drug cartels, Palestinian militants, and even the Taliban, sourced their weapons.

An estimated $2 to $3 billion worth of small arms and light weapons are sold in the black and gray markets every year, fueling non-state actors’ violence and conflicts around the world.

Most of these weapons come from the United States, Europe, and other large producers of defense equipment, but somehow find their way to arms traffickers.

Even in smaller countries, where local defense contractors that produce only parts of weapon systems, could find their products in the illicit markets.

An American official even said it is impossible track the stinger missiles and drones once they got into the black and gray markets.

What creates these markets for defense weapons?

The conflicts in the Middle East, where Israel has been battling with non-state actors, Hamas and Hezbollah militants, could be a factor.

Closer to home, NATO weapons, earmarked to help Ukraine repulse Russia, may have been channeled to the black market.

Interdependence has grown not only on producing consumer goods but on military and defense-related equipment as well.

For instance, an armored vehicle assembled in Brazil may have parts from Germany, the United States, and other countries.

A naval strike missile sold by European defense contractor to Malaysia has an American component and the deal was abruptly terminated. (Also read: Malaysia seeks $250 million damages from Norwegian supplier for revoked missile deal)

These are enough reasons for smaller defense contractors around the world, including the Philippines, to think twice to sell equipment and parts to both Ukraine and in the Middle East.

There were reports European companies sourced parts and other gadgets from smaller countries to sustain the conflict in Europe.

In Manila, there are companies who export small components of non-lethal equipment to Germany that find their way into the conflict zone.

This could complicate things as there were some Filipinos already hired as mercenaries for Russia and Ukraine. If certain parts or components made from the Philippines are found in the Ukraine conflict, it could embarrass the government of President Ferdinand Marcos, and the country’s chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this year. (Also read: Friends to all, enemies to no one)

It could also impact on its relations with an ASEAN dialogue partner marking 35 years of relations in the upcoming summit in Kazan, Russia.

Energy security would be high on the agenda in the June summit meeting as Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, searched for alternative sources of reliable and steady crude oil supply after three-month conflict in Iran drags on.

It is not wise for ASEAN, and the Philippines, to be drag into then conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, by exporting parts and components of lethal and non-lethal weapons to European states. These exported products may find their way to the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. (Also read: South China Sea Must Avoid Becoming Hormuz)

ASEAN, including the Philippines, must stay away from these smaller weapons and non-lethal deals because it may inadvertently helps a flourishing illegal arms market.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr at the opening Ceremony of the 48th ASEAN Summit and Related Meetings. Official Handout.

Rommel C. Banlaoi | May 29, 2026

At the recently concluded 48th Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cebu, regional leaders adopted the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Maritime Cooperation amidst the Hormuz crisis. By reaffirming the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the universal legal framework, ASEAN underscored its commitment to rules-based order in the maritime domain. The call for the early conclusion of a binding ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC) also reflects the urgent need to manage disputes peacefully and prevent escalation in contested waters in order to avoid a Hormuz situation in the South China Sea.

Equally significant is the endorsement of an ASEAN Maritime Centre in the Philippines, envisioned as a hub for coordinating maritime security, safety, and governance. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. emphasized that the center is not designed to confront any state but to advance cooperative navigation and shared responsibility in the seas. (Also read: ASEAN: Finding relevance in a burning world)

For ASEAN, the challenge now lies in translating this declaration into concrete action. Effective implementation is imperative to avoid a Hormuz scenario in the South China Sea, where unchecked tensions could jeopardize freedom of navigation and regional stability. (Also read: ASEAN calls for cessation of hostilities in the Middle East)

Instability in the Strait of Hormuz reminded the world of the fragility of maritime chokepoints. In 2025, an average of 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products per day transited Hormuz, which was equivalent to about 25% of global seaborne oil trade.

When the US–Iran War erupted, traffic immediately collapsed by over 90%, cutting global supply by 100 million barrels per week. Brent crude prices spiked above $106 per barrel, insurance premiums tripled, and 20,000 seafarers were stranded. These disruptions reverberated across global energy markets, threatening supply security and worsening the lives of billions of people worldwide. (Also read: Viable alternative to Middle East oil)

The South China Sea is no less vital. In 2025, it carried US$5.3 trillion worth of trade annually, equal to 24% of global maritime commerce. It handles 40% of global crude oil shipments and 34% of LNG flows, making it indispensable for Asia’s energy security. For China, more than 60% of maritime trade passes through these waters; for Japan, nearly 42%; and for Southeast Asia, the South China Sea is the lifeline of energy imports and exports.

These figures underscore why the South China Sea must not follow the catastrophe in Hormuz. It shows the world of the inconvenient truth that military actions only breed insecurities. The antidote in the South China Sea must, therefore, be amity and cooperation, not hostility and confrontation.

Thus, ASEAN needs to reaffirm this role. ASEAN’s cooperative vision can be reinforced by its broader security architecture. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has long been a venue for preventive diplomacy, bringing together 27 participants, including major powers, to build confidence and reduce tensions. The ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus, which includes external partners such as the US, China, Japan, India, and Russia, are crucial in promoting transparency, joint exercises, and practical maritime security cooperation.

All these mechanisms demonstrate ASEAN’s ability to convene diverse actors and keep the South China Sea within a framework of dialogue rather than confrontation, amity rather than hostility.

But ASEAN cannot succeed alone. Major powers must acknowledge that maritime stability in the South China Sea is a shared responsibility that transcends strategic rivalry. The United States and China, as two most influential actors, bear a special duty to ensure that their competition does not undermine the collective interest in safeguarding vital trade routes. Their cooperation remains indispensable to preventing miscalculation and ensuring freedom of navigation. (Also read: Dialogue with China Is Imperative: Trump–Xi Summit Proved It)

It is therefore important to build resilience together. ASEAN states, with support from external partners, should diversify strategic dependencies by investing in alternative energy corridors, renewable sources, and cross-border power grids. Shared infrastructure for overland trade and energy diversification can strengthen resilience while fostering mutual trust among nations.

Hormuz is an early warning. The South China Sea must avoid it. Cooperation among ASEAN members and major powers is a credible safeguard against crisis at sea. The lessons of Hormuz remind the world that unchecked rivalry and unilateral actions can easily escalate into maritime insecurity with global repercussions.

ASEAN’s centrality can provide an important anchor for regional stability. By reinforcing ASEAN centrality, member states can ensure that dialogue mechanisms remain inclusive and balanced, preventing the marginalization of smaller powers. It is therefore imperative to pursue legal frameworks, preventive diplomacy, and confidence-building measures in tandem with UNCLOS implementation in order to promote and maintain good order at sea.

It is also vital to strengthen maritime security cooperation among states. Joint patrols, coordinated humanitarian assistance, and transparent naval engagements can transform the South China Sea from a contested maritime space into a cooperative security community.

The world cannot afford another Hormuz in this region; instead, the South China Sea must evolve into a model of shared responsibility, demonstrating that multilateralism and trust can prevail over confrontation and mistrust.

The conclusion of the COC remains the most decisive step in promoting good manners and right conduct in the South China Sea. Beyond being a legal instrument, the COC symbolizes a collective commitment to civility, restraint, and respect for international norms. By institutionalizing behavioral guidelines, discouraging coercive actions, and encouraging cooperative practices, the COC can nurture a culture of responsibility among claimant states and external powers alike.

Finally, pursuing cooperation between the Philippines and China is also paramount. As frontline stakeholders, both countries must demonstrate that bilateral goodwill can complement multilateral frameworks, ensuring that the South China Sea does not follow the perilous trajectory of Hormuz but instead becomes a beacon of peace, cooperation, and shared prosperity at sea.

Rommel Banlaoi, PhD, is the President of Philippine Society for International Security Studies and Director of Philippines-China Studies Center at Diliman College.

American soldiers prepare a US Army Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System pod in Palawan during Exercise Balikatan last April 29. Photo by U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Jade Caldwell

Manuel Mogato | May 27, 2026

MANILA — Washington has announced a pause in its $14 billion arms sales to Taipei after President Donald Trump recently held talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Although some senior US defense and military officials said the decision to withhold the export of defense missiles, rockets, and armed drones to Taipei was due to the Middle East conflict, many believed China may have been behind the sudden policy change.

Beijing has been trying to stop Washington from selling arms to Taipei, a self-ruled island which China considers a renegade province.

What could the arms sales pause mean to Taiwan’s defenses when China reportedly planned to take over the island by 2027, as many US generals had predicted?

Can Taiwan still rely on the United States to defend the island? Will Taiwan look for alternative defense suppliers?

Just after Washington’s decision not to honor deals to deliver defense equipment to Taipei, Beijing’s Coast Guard moved close to Taipei-administered Pratas Island in the northern part of the South China Sea.

There was a brief standoff as the Taiwanese Coast Guard issued a radio challenge to the intruding Chinese Coast Guard vessels, which eventually left the area. (Also read: Taiwan raises defense spending to build air defense to counter China’s threats)

The recent Pratas incident would serve as a serious warning to Taiwan on what China would do now that the United States can abandon a security partner in an instant.

Taiwan is an integral part of the United States’ first island chain, which includes Japan in the north and the Philippines in the south. (Also read: Preparing for a humanitarian crisis if conflict erupts in Taiwan)

What message does Washington want to send to its allies in the region if it is willing to compromise the defense of an island, which is an important part of its imaginary defense line?

If the United States can easily abandon Taiwan, it could also renege on its commitment to the South China Sea if it runs counter to its interests, particularly in dealing wth China.

For instance, Beijing has started dumping US treasuries, a strategic diversification away from dollar-denominated assets and a de-risking maneuver amid geopolitical tensions.

Even if China cannot weaponize US debt, it may also damage its own economy by raising its currency’s value, making its exports less competitive.

However, it could raise US interest rates, and US bonds could plunge.

Thus, the direct impact of the US decision to withhold arms sales to Taiwan could be on the security, not only of the island, but also of the region.

Before Taiwan, the United States also pulled out its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea, redeploying the weapons systems to the Middle East to help intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.

Washington removed the missile interceptors despite protests from Seoul, which is worried about Pyongyang’s ballistic missile threats. (Also read: South Korea, Philippines deepen security, economic relations)

These lessons should make the Philippines rethink its defense and military cooperation arrangements with the United States.

Washington can pull out from Manila anytime, several of its missile systems - Typhon, HIMARS, NMESIS, and Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS).

It could also reverse its South China Sea policy and reduce its presence in the nine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) locations.

Trump has secured Xi’s promise not to send arms to help Iran; he has to make some concessions as well.

Taiwan was the most obvious bargaining chip.

Taiwan serves as a lesson. Washington generates profits from arms sales from Taipei. It has not sold any defense equipment from the Philippines, except for three Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules transport planes.

It was not successful in offering F-16 multi-role fighters. It may sell surveillance drones and other platforms, such as the Navy-Marines Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and the Army’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). (Also read: Why does the Air Force need a dedicated fighter trainer aircraft?)

No wonder Japan has started to flex its defense muscle, abandoning its Pacifist Constitution to rearm itself and export lethal weapons to its neighbors to strengthen the collective defense of the region if the United States retreats into its shell. (Also read: Is a militarized Japan a threat to the region?)

Countries in the Indo-Pacific should take care of their own security rather than rely on the waning power of the United States.

In Europe, the United States has allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) not only to share the burden but also to carry the defense load. Europe was also tasked to help Ukraine fight Russia.

Washington also focused on Iran, as the United States recognized that it could no longer fight in two theaters simultaneously.

The US allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region could no longer depend on Washington for providing a security umbrella.

They have to stand on their feet and fight without the US.

Members of the Senate Minority bloc at the plenary session on Tuesday, May 26. Photo from Senate Social Media Unit.

Manuel Mogato | May 27, 2026

MANILA — The Senate session abruptly ended this week when members of the minority bloc walked out from the session hall, ending a heated discussion on a proposal to amend rules on voting.

The 20th Senate’s first regular legislative session will resume next week, on the same day the upper chamber, sitting as an impeachment court, awaits the response from the vice president who is facing charges of bribery, misuse of public funds, unexplained wealth, and threats to assassinate the president.

As a legislative body, a member of the majority bloc proposed to change the way the Senate would vote on any major decision by allowing remote voting.

The Senate President, Alan Peter Cayetano, even moved to divide the house and decide on the proposal.

But the minority protested and questioned the haste in approving the proposal, arguing it might favor the majority bloc in allowing a fugitive member to cast a vote, including in the impeachment of the vice president.

Senator Ronald Dela Rosa has been on the run after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity. (Also read: Self-Serving Criminal Behavior by Senators and the Undermining of a Republic)

Former President Rodrigo Duterte is similarly facing charges at the ICC after he was arrested in March 2025.

Dela Rosa was the former National police chief under Duterte when he the president and carried out the war of drugs policy that killed thousands.

The proposal would allow Dela Rosa to cast his vote on the impeachment of Duterte’s daughter, Sara Duterte-Carpio. (Also read: Senate convenes as an impeachment court to hold trial to remove or not the vice president)

It could allow other senators who may be arrested and jailed for the anomalous infrastructure projects.

The Office of the Ombudsman is set to file plunder charges against Senator Jinggoy Estrada this week.

Senators Rodante Marcoleta and Joel Villanueva may face similar charges before the anti-graft Sandiganbayan court.

The Sandiganbayan had issued hold departure order against Marcoleta to stop him leaving the country.

Senators Estrada, Marcoleta, and Villanueva belonged to the majority bloc.

Minority Senator Erwin Tulfo questioned the majority bloc’s move to railroad the proposal to favor jailed senators.

His colleague, Senator Risa Hontiveros, also questioned the proposal without passing through the rules committee, which has to be formed.

When the majority bloc insisted on discussing the proposal without going through a process at the rules committee, the minority left the session hall.

Senate minority leader Vicente Sotto III questioned the quorum and moved to adjourn the session.

The Senate holds only three day a week session from Monday to Wednesday.

The senators decided to resume legislative session next Monday as the nation goes on holiday for a Muslim Eid al-Adha.

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. visited the 79th Infantry Battalion in Sagay City and the 15th Infantry Battalion sa Cauayan, Negros Occidental last Saturday, May 23, 2026.

Joe M. Reyes | May 25, 2026

BACOLOD CITY — Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. has warned that the New People’s Army (NPA) rebels were using a recent firefight with soldiers to raise funds by appealing to supporters abroad.

Teodoro said at least 19 armed Maoist-led rebels had died in clashes with the Philippine Army in northern Negros.

However, the guerrillas wanted to turn the tragedy into a fund-raising activity by appealing to rebel sympathizers to donate for the slain rebels. (Also read: Teodoro rejects resuming peace talks with Maoist rebels)

“They are using the tragic death of these 19 people as a propaganda tool for them to gain relevance, power, and maybe they seek the status of legitimacy,” Teodoro told journalists during a troop visit to one of the Communist insurgency hotbeds.

Teodoro said it is obvious the communist movement is getting funding from foreign groups, but declined to elaborate.

“I cannot disclose the information, since the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) has been looking into it. We cannot even access that information unless there is an anti-money laundering case.”

In the past, the rebels raised funds through threats and intimidation, targeting mining and agricultural companies in the provinces, as well as large conglomerates, construction, and other big companies in urban centers

There were also intelligence reports suggesting that millions of dollars were also raised from foreign civil society groups, human rights advocates, and like-minded supporters. (Also read: Security adviser opposes peace talks with Maoist rebels)

The rebels also imposed revolutionary taxes on poor Filipinos, and those who refused to contribute were executed.

Teodoro also denounced false information about the firefight. “There’s a lot of misinformation coming out,” he said.

“I’m here to correct that misimpression and misinformation. And I am 100 percent sure of the legitimacy, not only the planning, but also the conduct of the operation in Toboso and Cauayan.”

Crew of HNLMS De Ruyter reposition the NH-90 helicopter aboard the ship on Friday, May 22, during their port call in Manila. Photo by Anna Mogato.

Manuel Mogato | May 25, 2026

MANILA — In the 16th century, European powers raced against each other to secure trade routes and control the spice trade in Southeast Asia.

The Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English seized territories in this part of the world in search of riches: raw materials and minerals to fuel their engines of growth.

Most countries in the region remained exploited colonies of waning European powers until the second half of the 20th century.

The rise of new world superpowers — the United States and the former Soviet Union — forced the European powers to retreat, giving up their colonies in this part of the world.

The French lost Indo-China, the English gave up Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore, the Spanish ceded the Philippines, and the Dutch freed Indonesia.

However, in the 21st century, there was a sudden interest in Western Europe to return to Southeast Asia.

Europe said it is back, not for the spices and other riches, but to secure trade routes that may affect its economic lifeblood.

Invoking the rules-based global order and freedom of navigation, France, Germany, Great Britain, and now the Netherlands have sent warships to the South China Sea, where about $3 trillion worth of trade passes annually.

The commanding officer of a Dutch guided-missile frigate, HNLMS De Ruyter, Commander Rodger de Wit, articulated European’s renewed interest in the region.

“The Indo-Pacific region, and especially Southeast Asia, is really important for Europe and the Netherlands, because a huge chunk of its trade goes by sea, from here to Europe, and keeping stability and freedom of navigation, in this area, is a vital role for us to keep the trade flowing towards Europe,” de Wit said, as the Dutch warship made a brief port call to Manila.

“We are strong supporters of freedom of navigation, and the UN Security Council for the resolution of the law of the sea. It doesn’t matter if that’s the North Sea, the South China Sea, or wherever […] and that’s the reason why we’re here to promise that freedom of navigation and keep the seas open and to keep the trade going.”

Is Europe only interested in securing global trade routes? Or does Europe’s interest lie beyond freedom of navigation and the rule of law?

Did the United States ask its European allies to help police one of the world’s most volatile sea lanes as Washington’s dominance wanes and countries in the region begin to doubt its “ironclad” commitment to deter a rising China?

But what can Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization do to stop China when they struggle in their own backyard against threats from Russia after it crossed into Ukraine in early 2022?

Washington has pulled out some troops in Berlin and redeployed them to the Middle East as conflict with Tehran has dragged on for months.

Europe and NATO were forced to increase defense spending to 5 percent of their GDP and strengthen their deterrence capabilities.

Germany, for instance, set aside $100 billion to rebuild its army, recruit more soldiers, and upgrade capabilities to contain Russia. (Also read: Germany seeking closer defense ties with Philippines)

However, Europe and NATO have to spend more to help the United States counter China’s creeping influence, not only in the Indo-Pacific region, but in other parts of the world — the Pacific, South America, Africa, and the Middle East.

Europe and NATO’s discomfort with China surfaced after it joined Russian military drills along their eastern borders.

Chinese vessels have also started showing up in the Arctic Ocean, posing a direct threat to Europe and NATO.

With limited capabilities and a smaller fleet, it is highly doubtful if European powers, including NATO, can make a difference in the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture.

Commander De Wit’s big words should be matched with actions. However, the Netherlands has only four guided-missile frigates, and can commit only one vessel in the region every two years.

The Philippines, the weakest among Washington’s allies in the first island chain, similarly has four missile-guided frigates.

It was puzzling why Europe is suddenly interested in this region when it has to remain focused on its own region, with the four-year conflict in Ukraine.

France signed a status-of-forces arrangement with the Philippines. The United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands have expressed similar defense arrangements with the Philippines.

What can these military-to-military activities contribute to the Philippines’ increased deterrence capabilities?

Or are these arrangements part of a sales pitch to offer European and NATO armaments to an emerging weapons-systems market in the region?

The exercises and training exchanges are a way to introduce European defense equipment that could enhance interoperability, a cheaper alternative to US defense equipment.

European defense manufacturers had sold naval guns on vessels, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters, trainer planes, armored vehicles, and combat utility helicopters.

They are also offering conventional submarines, multi-role fighters, and trainer jets.

Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines, must be wary of Europe’s real intentions in the region. (Also read: Why countries in Southeast Asia should not fear Japan?)

In the end, it boils down to business interests.

Europe is back, not to take the spices, but to offer weapon systems and, at the same time, help contain China, which has started to show on its own borders.

Senators take their oath as Senator Judges on Monday, May 18, marking the start of Vice President Sara Duterte’s pre-trial impeachment proceedings. Photo from the Senate of the Philippines Social Media Unit.

COL (R) Dencio S. Acop, PhD, CPP | May 25, 2026

The Filipino people have just witnessed the most brazen obstruction of justice happening right in the highest place where laws of the Philippines are decided. Thirteen (13) senators managed to stage a coup to control the upper chamber just when the lower house impeached Vice-President Sara Duterte for misuse of public funds, unexplained wealth, corruption and bribery, and assassination threats against the President.

To garner the majority number, even fugitive senator, Ronald Dela Rosa, who has been hiding for six months, suddenly showed-up, stumbling all over himself as NBI agents tried to serve him a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity in former president Rodrigo Duterte’s illegal drug war which killed thousands. Duterte himself is now undergoing trial in The Hague.

Why did the thirteen senators do what they did? This article argues that they did it to exonerate themselves from criminal charges, especially those stemming from the massive flood control anomalies, as well as other corruption-related charges, using their government powers to do so. (Also read: Sandiganbayan orders arrest of former congressman tagged in flood control corruption)

Fearful of the truth coming out which would convict them, they have resorted to technicalities exploiting the “letter” of the law to subvert its “substance.” By also exonerating the vice-president from any indictment of wrongdoing removing her from power, they hope to see their political ally win the 2028 presidential elections so they will not be indicted for their own crimes which will end their political careers and put them behind bars.

The only problem with this scheme is that it plays right into the hands of China. A presidency by another Duterte would formally pivot back the Philippines to the orbit of China as what happened in 2016-2022. (Also read: Duterte’s Gentleman’s Agreement)

Because of the inroads made possible by the Duterte administration to China, the Chinese Communist Party has been able to plant seeds using money and coercion to convince Philippine officials and some citizenry to view China as the “future.” This winning over of Filipinos to their side is why some of us, especially the “Die-hard Duterte Supporters” (DDS), seem to look the other way in China’s intrusions and robberies into the Philippines’ maritime territories and exclusive economic zones in the West Philippine Sea.

Sadly, even some of our senators can now be assumed to be right inside the pockets of Chinese officials and interests by their very own actions and pronouncements. The article likewise argues that consistent with China’s strategy to win over its enemies, including the Philippines, without having to fire a single shot, subtle joint ventures like the “Build, Build, Build” and flood control projects can also perfectly tie-in to China’s scheme to subvert the Philippines from within. If corruption has ballooned in the Philippines, it is because corruption is a favorite strategy of China to destroy its enemies from the inside and simultaneously advance Chinese national interests in the process. Corruption is the “means” used by China and how the Chinese Communist Party applies this “means” to break the enemy’s will to resist to achieve its “ends” (advancing Chinese national interest) is its “ways.”

China’s aim is not necessarily to win on the battlefield. Today, such would be too disruptive and destructive even for China. Applying not just Carl von Clausewitz’s treatise but Sun Tzu’s as well, the aim of China is not to be victorious on the battlefield, but to win the war well before the battle is fought. Corruption already existed in the Philippines manifested by Filipino political dynasties which are rampant. It has become embedded in the larger Filipino culture becoming a sub-culture itself. While there are formal institutions and policies in place, it is really the actual implementation that defines the effectiveness of these formalities. And this reality includes the informal corruption which appears to satisfy the “letter” of the law but not its “spirit.”

It is the insidious nature of corruption that gave rise to the Filipino culture of “dualism.” It allowed China to merely exploit these dysfunctional dynamics in Filipino society to advance her own national interests. The magnitude and pervasiveness of corruption in the Philippines can be sized up in the number of political dynasties that exist. While there is no exact count, nearly 250 political families control almost all the country’s 82 provinces, with dynastic clans holding over 70% of incumbent local government and legislative posts. These dynasties are either “thin” or “fat.”

The former includes relatives who hold the same political seat in succession. The latter includes multiple relatives holding different government positions simultaneously. Eleven of the 13 senators who supported the recent coup come from corrupt political dynasties and some of them have already been indicted or convicted of crimes ranging from illegal possession of firearms to plunder and crimes against humanity. A Chinese ally, Duterte willingly played into the hands of China handing his country over on a silver platter. Now, half of the country, including the 13 senators, are complicit in China’s ongoing game. In this game, however, China wins but the Philippines loses.

Consider these ongoing and historical facts. The first point that can be inferred is that five out of the thirteen coup-plotting senators are involved in the massive flood control scams. Young and ambitious, Mark Villar played a key role. Appointed as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) by Duterte, Villar implemented the “Build, Build, Build” program which tied into the global “Belt and Road Initiative” program of China, which funded infrastructure projects and grants. While some were real projects, later investigations also uncovered “ghost projects.”

Villar now heads the list of current senators directly implicated in the ongoing and widening multibillion-peso flood-control project scandals, which includes current fellow senators Jinggoy Estrada, Joel Villanueva, Francis Escudero, and Bong Go; as well as former senators Bong Revilla, Nancy Binay, Grace Poe, and Cynthia Villar. In 2025, former DPWH officials executed sworn affidavits claiming that Jinggoy Estrada received massive commissions (25-30%) from multimillion-peso flood-control projects in Bulacan.

The second point is that all 13 senators are somehow involved in alleged crimes or anomalies throughout their political and public careers. Three senators are subjects of past, current, and future indictments. One was convicted and served time in jail until he got pardoned. And one was held civilly liable in a court of law. Alan Cayetano is suspected of indirect corruption links to flood control and ghost projects implemented in 2025-2026 due to questionable 869 million pesos worth of projects awarded to Taguig City where the mayor is his wife. As chair of the Philippine Southeast Asian Games Organizing Committee, Cayetano faced scrutiny when the Commission on Audit flagged anomalies and irregularities in billions of pesos worth of contracts including the controversial P50 million cauldron in New Clark City. The P71 million donation he gave to Duterte’s presidential campaign in 2016 was highly suspicious as it heavily exceeded the net worth he declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth at the time. In 2014, he and his wife faced multiple graft and plunder complaints filed before the office of the Ombudsman for misusing his Priority Development Assistance Fund and participating in the procurement of overpriced multi-cabs.

Legarda has been linked to several corruption and conflict-of-interest scandals. In 2025-2026, her name is included in documents relating to budget insertions for flood control projects handled by the DPWH. Her own son, Batangas Representative Leandro Leviste, claimed that Legarda is one of the senators linked to roughly PhP1 billion in project allocations. Legarda faced multiple graft complaints filed before the Ombudsman by public interest advocate Louis Biraogo. She was accused of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly failing to declare a PhP36 million condominium in New York City and a multi-million-peso mansion in Forbes Park. Aside from these, she has faced criticism for conflict-of-interest concerns regarding her son’s business interests related to legislative franchises.

Villanueva is also currently linked to several corruption scandals, primarily the multi-billion-peso flood control corruption scandal, which is ongoing, and the pork barrel scam. Whistleblowers and the Independent Commission for Infrastructure accused Villanueva of receiving a 30% kickback (amounting to an estimated P150 million) from P600 million worth of flood control projects in Bulacan in 2023. As a result, the ICI recommended filing of plunder, graft, and bribery charges against Villanueva to the Ombudsman. In 2015, Villanueva was also involved in the infamous PDAF scam orchestrated by Janet Lim Napoles. He was accused of misusing PhP10 million in pork barrel funds while serving as a party-list representative. While the Ombudsman originally ordered his dismissal from government in 2016 for grave misconduct and malversation, he was subsequently not charged because his case allegedly faced complicated, legal hurdles.

While not formally charged or directly implicated, Pia Cayetano has faced public scrutiny and political backlash for defending her family and colleagues during investigations into alleged government irregularities. She drew criticism and clashed with fellow senators when she defended her brother Alan relative to the 2019 SEA Games funding anomalies and irregularities in billions of pesos worth of contracts including the controversial P50 million cauldron in New Clark City. She has also faced further scrutiny by association during recent legislative probes into the escalating multi-billion-peso costs of the New Senate Building and alleged anomalies within the 2025 national budget.

Dela Rosa was indicted by the ICC in an arrest warrant unsealed on May 11, 2026. The ICC charged him with crimes against humanity for his alleged role in extrajudicial killings as the chief of the Philippine National Police during Duterte’s deadly “war on drugs”. Dela Rosa has also been involved in several controversies and irregularities primarily centered on his tenure as PNP chief. Prosecutors have pointed out his violent rhetoric where he openly encouraged police and citizens to target and kill drug suspects.

While Dela Rosa manifested no respect for the law by his own words and actions, he sought protective custody in the Philippine Senate when it was his turn to be arrested by National Bureau of Investigation agents. His evasion culminated in a chaotic shootout inside the Senate. Following the incident, he again went back into hiding. However, the Department of Justice has just issued a public statement that the NBI and the PNP can now arrest the fugitive lawmaker. Contrary to claims by Duterte supporters that the ICC cannot supersede local laws, the Philippines has a law, crafted by some opposing senators themselves, that aligns with the ICC’s prosecutorial process. Due to his prolonged absence from official sessions and activities, the Alliance of Concerned Teachers and other government watchdog groups filed ethics complaints against Dela Rosa accusing him of dereliction of duty and abuse of privilege.

For his part, Escudero is currently facing two major corruption-related investigations involving plunder, graft, and bribery complaints. He is being investigated by the Ombudsman for allegedly receiving hundreds of millions of pesos in kickbacks tied to government-funded flood control projects. The anti-graft court Sandiganbayan has issued a Precautionary Hold Departure Order barring him from leaving the country due to the gravity of his case. In another case, a lawyer filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against the lawmaker and other provincial officials for alleged financial irregularities amounting to PhP352 million during his term as provincial governor of Sorsogon (2019-2022).

Jinggoy Estrada has been indicted and arrested multiple times for major corruption and plunder charges throughout his political career. In 2001, he was indicted and detained alongside his father, former President Joseph Estrada, for allegedly amassing ill-gotten wealth. But he was acquitted of this charge in 2007. In 2014, he was again indicted for plunder and multiple counts of graft for allegedly pocketing PhP183 million in kickbacks by funneling discretionary funds through bogus NGOs. In 2024, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him of plunder. While he was initially convicted of bribery, the court eventually reversed these convictions in 2024. However, his 11 related graft trials have proceeded. In 2026, the DOJ recommended new plunder and graft charges against Estrada and former DPWH Secretary Manuel Bonoan for allegedly receiving millions in kickbacks from regional flood control projects in Bulacan.

Go is primarily linked to two major controversies: a public works infrastructure scandal, and the ICC’s investigation into the war on drugs. Go and his patron, Duterte, were named in a plunder complaint filed by former Senator Antonio Trillanes IV. The complaint alleges that construction firms owned by Go’s father (CLTG Builders) and his half-brother (Alfrego Builders) cornered billions of pesos in government contracts during the Duterte administration. The controversies specifically link Go’s family’s construction firms to joint venture contracts with St. Gerrard Construction, a company at the center of the Philippine government’s investigation into the massive, anomalous awarding of flood mitigation and road projects. Meanwhile, in its investigation into the “war on drugs” during the Duterte administration, the ICC has named Go as an alleged co-perpetrator in the crimes against humanity case. Go was identified as one of eight current and former Philippine officials in official ICC filings outlining his alleged co-conspiracy. Court documents name the other Philippine officials as: Vitaliano Aguirre II (former Justice secretary), Oscar Albayalde (former PNP chief), Vicente Danao (former PNP chief and former Davao City police chief), Camilco Cascolan (former PNP chief who passed away in 2023), Dante Gierran (former NBI director), and Isidro Lapena (former PDEA chief). Former Senator Trillanes has publicly stated he expects an arrest warrant to follow for Go, citing his role as a key aide to former President Duterte during the “drug war”.

Marcoleta is primarily linked to political and financial controversies surrounding his campaign finances, the multi-billion-peso flood control anomalies, and past pork barrel issues. As chair of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, he came under heavy scrutiny for defending the immunity of key contractors (the Discaya couple) and was accused of conflict-of-interest due to his wife serving as an independent director and audit committee chair at insurance companies that provided multi-million-peso bonds for those same contractors. Following his 2025 senatorial campaign, Marcoleta faced scrutiny for under-declaring campaign contributions in his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures. He declared zero campaign contributions despite reporting expenditures of over PhP112 million while only declaring a personal net worth of PhP52 million. By his own admission, he accepted millions in undeclared “donations” prompting fellow Senator Panfilo Lacson to say that Marcoleta’s actions could constitute indirect bribery under Philippine law. Marcoleta was implicated in the “Napolist” by the COA which alleged that he channeled PhP15 million of his PDAF to dubious, non-existent NGOs between 2007 and 2009 during the time he served as a representative for the Alagad Party-list (2004-2013).

Imee Marcos has been linked to the massive flood control scandal, alleged pork-barrel disbursements under her brother’s administration, and historical ill-gotten wealth. She was civilly held liable by a Honolulu US district court in the 1993 Trajano v. Marcos Case for the 1977 torture and killing of 21 y/o Mapua Institute of Technology student Archimedes Trajano who was seized, tortured, and beaten to death by her bodyguards. She was a presidential daughter at the time who was assigned full-time security escorts from the Presidential Security Command. Arrogantly responding to the district court, Marcos said: “Yes, Archimedes Trajano was tortured and killed but it’s none of your business.” While Marcos has attacked even her own brother (President Marcos Jr.) and first cousin (former House Speaker Martin Romualdez) of involvement in the massive flood control scam, other administration officials like Senator Lacson, have accused her of trying to shift the blame, pointing out her own history of bypassing budget oversights and refusal to sign the national budget. During her term as Ilocos Norte governor (2010-2019), she faced a House investigation regarding the highly irregular use of PhP45 million in provincial tobacco excise taxes to purchase 115 motor vehicles without mandatory public bidding. As the eldest child of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, she is historically linked to the systemic plunder of the Philippine treasury and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth – issues that have been ruled upon by multiple international and Philippine courts.

Of all the senators, Padilla is the only one so far who has been convicted of a crime. He was convicted in 1994 for illegal ownership of multiple firearms after sideswiping a balut vendor along MacArthur Highway. He served four years in prison, granted conditional pardon by President Fidel Ramos in 1998, and given absolute pardon by Duterte in 2016. He has remained a loyal Duterte supporter ever since.

Camille Villar, alongside her brother Mark, is among several incumbent senators tied to the ongoing investigations into alleged anomalies in government flood-control projects. These inquiries involve allegations that specific infrastructure projects disproportionately benefited the Villar family’s property and business interests. Villar, alongside her family and executives at Villar Land Holdings Corp., is facing a criminal complaint for alleged market manipulation, insider trading, and misleading disclosures. The Securities and Exchange Commission alleges that company disclosures distorted share prices and over-valued land assets, and that Villar specifically engaged in insider trading by purchasing company shares just before a major corporate disclosure in 2017.

Finally, Mark Villar is primarily linked to two major corruption and financial controversies during his time heading the DPWH and his family’s business dealings. In hearings on the flood-control scams, DPWH officials revealed that Villar “oversaw a massive kickback system”. “Whistleblowers claimed that Villar received a percentage of kickbacks on multibillion-peso flood-control and infrastructure projects”, allegedly funneled through his cousin, contractor Carlo Aguilar. The DOJ has also investigated the Villar family for “prohibited interest” regarding roughly PhP18.5 billion in government contracts awarded to firms owned by their relatives. In April 2026, the SEC filed criminal complaints against Villar Land Holdings Corp. and its directors – including Villar, his parents, and sister – over allegations of insider trading, market manipulation, and misleading disclosures that distorted share prices.

Third point is the fact that eleven of the thirteen senators belong to political dynasties. It must be pointed out that the 1987 Philippine Constitution contains a mandate in Article II, Section 26 to “prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law”. While this requires an enabling statute from Congress to take effect, such law banning political dynasties still does not exist to this day.

While bills have been filed in both houses, they have encountered stiff hurdles. Since the legislature has historically been dominated by members of political clans, no such law has ever been successfully passed. To become a finalized law, the measures must pass third reading in the House, be approved by the Senate, and be reconciled in a bicameral conference committee before being signed by the President. Until then, political clans remain a persistent fixture in both local and national Philippine politics.

The problem of systemic corruption is in part related to political dynasties which invite nepotism and other illegalities into the business of governance ending in conflicts-of-interest wherein personal, vested interests compete with a public servant’s vow to serve the national interest first. This reality in Philippine politics helps explain why the senators in question are somehow involved in alleged crimes or anomalies throughout their political and public careers. Of the thirteen senators, only Marcoleta and Dela Rosa do not belong to political dynasties.

Point number four is the fact that all thirteen senators who are Duterte supporters are also China sympathizers at the expense of the Philippines based on their public pronouncements and actions on China’s illegal incursions in the West Philippine Sea. Some Filipino citizens, critical of their seemingly pro-China stance in the country’s row with China, have gone to the extent of calling them “Tsinadors” or “Chinadors.”

As Duterte’s foreign secretary (2017-2018), Alan Cayetano was the primary architect executing the administration’s pivot toward Beijing. He regularly traveled to China, met with prominent Chinese officials like Wang Qishan and Li Keqiang, and famously hand-carried letters to President Xi Jinping to usher in what he termed a “golden era” of bilateral ties. He drew criticism for downplaying Chinese military constructions in the South China Sea, publicly stating that China was not a military threat to the Philippines despite such incursions by the People’s Liberation Army and Chinese Coast Guard. Cayetano has also been a vocal proponent of joint resource (oil and gas) exploration in the West Philippine Sea.

A believer of the Economic Peace Theory, he argues that being business partners prevents conflict, stating that if neighbors are mutually benefiting from oil and gas, “definitely there may be peace.”

In early 2026, he opposed passing resolutions against the Chinese Embassy’s harsh public remarks against Philippine government officials.

Legarda has handled numerous bilateral agreements and issues concerning China as a former chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. She serves as a co-chair for the Philippines on the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, a global cross-party group of lawmakers working to reform how democratic nations approach Beijing. She has spoken in favor of diplomatic dialogue and joint economic and oil/gas exploration with China, provided it respects the Hague ruling on Philippine maritime rights. While she has raised alarm bells about potential “creeping invasions” and territorial encroachment by China in the West Philippine Sea, she has historically supported policies that avoid military conflict in favor of peaceful consultations and adherence to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. (Also read: Civilians plant the Philippine flag in a disputed feature in the South China Sea)

While Villanueva has strong views against China’s aggression in the West Philippine Sea, his political stance has since changed due to his vulnerabilities stemming from his legal cases involving plunder, graft, and bribery charges filed with the Ombudsman. This is unfortunate for Philippine national interest because his track record regarding China has focused on accountability and the protection of Philippine sovereignty. Villanueva filed Senate Resolution No. 980 condemning China’s unprovoked harassment, water cannon attacks, and illegal actions against the Philippine Coast Guard in the West Philippine Sea. He has publicly dismissed the purported “gentleman’s agreement” between former President Duterte and the Chinese government, labeling it a mere Chinese propaganda tactic intended to divide Filipinos. In 2019, he actively contested an infrastructure loan deal with China. He criticized provisions that allowed seizure of Philippine patrimonial assets upon default and called the employment of Chinese nationals in local projects unconstitutional and unfair to Filipinos. He has been a vocal critic of foreign nationals circumventing Philippine laws, demanding stringent probes into the illegal offshore gaming operations (POGOs) primarily linked to Chinese criminal syndicates.

Like Villanueva, Pia Cayetano also had strong views against China’s aggression in the West Philippine Sea. But, unlike him, Cayetano has not been directly linked to major irregularities. Nonetheless, her political stance has since changed due to her sympathetic support of relatives and colleagues affirming China’s interests more than the Philippines’. Cayetano was the sponsor of R.A. 11590, the law that established the tax regime for POGOs in 2021. While meant to regulate and tax the industry, it inadvertently facilitated the widespread presence of Chinese-backed online gambling operations. She later supported the subsequent nationwide ban on POGOs following investigations into associated crimes. She was one of the senators who did not sign a senate resolution condemning statements made by the Chinese Embassy against Philippine officials and institutions. Her supposed justification was to balance the defense of local maritime rights with continued diplomatic engagement with Beijing, despite the latter’s undiplomatic behavior.

While Dela Rosa is a loyal ally of Duterte – whose administration pursued closer ties with Beijing – he has publicly rejected being labeled “pro-China” and has consistently asserted a firm stance against Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea. However, his stance is likewise inconsistent since he rejects U.S. support suggesting the termination of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement when US lawmakers threatened withholding aid to Philippine security forces due to the extrajudicial killings.

Escudero’s stance on China is largely similar with that of most of his colleagues — diplomatic engagement to a fault. Strangely, he has cited the unconstitutionality of armed conflict as his reason for preferring diplomacy to resolve the West Philippine Sea dispute with China. Surely, he must know that the Philippine Constitution allows the Philippines to defend itself from invaders and occupiers. Such provisions are contained in Articles II and VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Escudero also did not sign the January 2026 Senate Resolution (SR No. 256) condemning the Chinese Embassy’s undiplomatic remarks against Philippine officials and institutions.

While Jinggoy Estrada has called out China’s incursions in the West Philippine Sea as Chair of the Senate Committee on National Defense, his being one of the 13 senators ultimately supports the accused Sara Duterte whose non-impeachment (if their scheme will be successful) could mean a possible second Duterte administration in 2028 favorable to Beijing. At one time, he urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to summon Chinese diplomats regarding illegal Chinese actions in the West Philippine Sea. He has historically defended his father, former President Joseph Estrada, against allegations he made a promise to China to remove the grounded Philippine outpost vessel in the Ayungin Shoal. He has publicly dismissed purported audio recordings released by Chinese officials as “disinformation” and a trap designed to distract from the real issues.

As a key ally, Go accompanied Duterte on several high-level state visits to China during his administration, including a trip in August 2019 to meet with President Xi Jinping. He supported the proposal to appoint former President Duterte as a special envoy to China to help ease diplomatic tensions between Manila and Beijing.

Of the 13 senators, Marcoleta’s support of China is the most palpable, even treasonous. It is based on recent controversial policy arguments and diplomatic engagements where his positions frequently aligned with Beijing’s narratives, though he strongly rejects allegations that he is defending China or acting as her local mouthpiece, disloyal to the Philippines. Marcoleta drew intense public backlash – sparking an online Change.org petition calling for his isolation – after he suggested the Philippines “give up” the Kalayaan Island Group to avoid armed conflict. He has even questioned the “existence” of the West Philippine Sea, noting that it is “merely a governmental concept”. He also echoed Chinese complaints that Philippine Coast Guard officials were portraying China as a “villain” in maritime disputes. Despite his controversial statements, Marcoleta has repeatedly pushed back accusations of being a “Chinador”, clarifying that his remarks are meant merely to reinforce logical arguments about territorial disputes rather than cede Philippine territory.

Imee Marcos advocates friendlier bilateral relations with China, opposes defense pacts with the United States, and likes to mediate diplomatic exchanges that promote Chinese interests. She has hosted Chinese Communist Party delegates at the Marcos ancestral home, calling Chinese officials and the Party “personal friends and allies”. She actively campaigned against the Philippines being forced to choose between the US and China, advocating for a re-examination of US-Philippine defense agreements like the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. As chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, she has criticized the Philippine government’s “reckless rhetoric” against Beijing, urging that maritime conflicts be handled with reason rather than emotion. She formally convened Senate inquiries to ensure the Philippine government respects the One China Policy and avoids getting entangled in the Taiwan dispute. She notably declined to sign Senate resolutions condemning illegal Chinese actions in the West Philippine Sea. Her pro-China stance is a major point of disagreement with her brother, President Bongbong Marcos.

Padilla pushes for diplomatic conciliation and professional engagement with China, including joint oil exploration. He has actively advocated for joint oil and gas exploration to help solve the Philippines’ energy dependency. He has held meetings with officials like former Ambassador Huang Xilian to discuss potential areas of cooperation and issues related to offshore gaming.

When asked by a vlogger during her 2025 senatorial campaign whether she was “pro-Philippines or pro-China”, Camille Villar dodged the question. A video footage of the encounter went viral forcing Villar to later clarify on Inquirer.net that she is staunchly pro-Philippines and just didn’t hear the question clearly during the sortie. Critics frequently associate Villar’s sentiments on China as similar to those of her mother, former Senator Cynthia Villar, who made headlines in 2024 by stating that the Philippines should find a “common ground” and compromise with China over territorial tensions in the West Philippine Sea due to military disparities. But despite the political scrutiny regarding her family’s stance, Villar still joined 14 other senators in early 2026 who signed a Senate Resolution condemning Chinese embassy officials for castigating Philippine officials over the West Philippine issue, according to OneNews.ph.

Finally, Mark Villar spearheaded and oversaw several major China-funded infrastructure projects and grants during his tenure as Secretary of the DPWH during the Duterte administration until he ran for the Senate. As DPWH head, Villar managed bilateral agreements with China under the “Build, Build, Build” program which tied in with China’s global Belt and Road Initiative. This included Chinese-funded grant projects such as the Binondo-Intramuros Bridge and the Estrella-Pantaleon Bridge. Villar publicly championed infrastructure cooperation with China, noting that the partnership and Official Development Assistance would mutually benefit Filipinos. Except that the projects were also marred by massive corruption issues later illustrated by the multi-billion-peso flood-control scam. Villar has also historically expressed a cautious approach toward calls for outright boycotts of Chinese goods stemming from Chinese illegal actions in the West Philippine Sea.

Fifth point advanced by this analysis is the fact that all 13 senators are well-educated. All are college graduates except for Imee Marcos whose highest educational attainment is that of an undergraduate enrollee. In fact, two senators graduated with honors; three are lawyers; and, one has a doctorate degree in public administration from the University of the Philippines. As such, they are in a good position to discern what is in the best interest of the Philippines with all stakes considered using empirical evidence and the factual merits and demerits of the case.

Point number six is that all 13 senators are or have been married and have children. Eight of them are Roman Catholics; Three are Evangelical Born-Again Christians; One is a Muslim; and One is a member of Iglesia Ni Cristo. What these facts imply is that these senators believe in a moral God whose primordial teaching is the pursuit of living this life in the spirit of truth, love, peace, and respect of the dignity of human life.

They also imply that these senators are leading public servants whose oaths of office mandate them to uphold the Philippine Constitution and its laws for the common good of the Filipino people and not just a few and certainly not those of an invading foreign power.

Finally, these values imply that as parents, they would want to leave a legacy founded on moral order for the sake of their children and grandchildren. Problem with China is that while it extends the hand of friendship, it has also invaded Philippine territory and exclusive economic zone. While it says one thing, it has done another. While it preaches diplomacy, it has used armed power to bully the weak. Problem with China is that its ends, ways, and means are amoral; while the Philippines is a Democracy that believes in the moral order, despite its weaknesses and flaws.

In conclusion, the thirteen senators in question must do the right thing. It means subordinating their individually vested and personal interests to the larger national interest and greater good of the Republic.

It also means leading the prosecution of criminal justice in the country instead of obstructing the flow of justice. That is the ideal matter which is the subject of this discourse. On the practical side, it would do well for these senators to enter a plea deal with the Philippine government to arrive at a win-win which would help their individual causes but not at the expense of the larger national interest and security.

While the thirteen senators thought they had put one over the government by putting on that spectacle in the Senate, they have only managed to force the hand of government and provided it reason to similarly apply all the power of the law it possesses to be used against any of them who has erred in the eyes of the law. As this article points out, almost each one of them is hiding behind their majority control to evade the long arm of the law (which ultimately favors Chinese interest) down the stretch since almost all are involved in some corruption irregularity like the massive flood-control scam silently facilitated by Chinese agents.

Every senator charged with plunder should become wary of being arrested next. Plunder is a non-bailable offense, and a senator-detainee would need official permission to be granted furlough to be physically present on the floor of the senate when voting for a new senate leadership. There is a precedent to this predicament in the Leila de Lima case orchestrated by the Duterte administration.

Once operationalized, the Senate will soon have a new majority whose legacy would be to redeem the lost honor and glory of the Philippine Senate which was degraded to a laughing spectacle by 13 self-serving senators just for “thirty pieces of rotten silver.”