Drones & chokepoints: Lessons for PH from Ukraine, Iran
The Philippines has much to learn on how Iran and Ukraine managed to stand a chance against bigger adversaries in the age of asymmetric warfare, veteran defense journalist Rodney Jaleco writes.
Rodney J. Jaleco | June 22, 2026
WASHINGTON D.C. — Beyond the nascent domination of unmanned platforms or a renewed appreciation of the value of chokepoints, the way Ukraine and Iran have waged asymmetric war against superior Russian and American forces could help shape the strategic defense strategy for the Philippines.
Perhaps the biggest lesson for the Philippines is how large geography stands out as a pillar of strategic deterrence.
Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz triggered a global chain of events, including spiraling prices in the US at a time when crucial congressional elections could wrestle control of Capitol Hill from Pres. Trump’s Republicans to Democrats and raise prospects for another impeachment against the already twice-impeached American chief executive.
Ukraine has exploited the geography of the Black Sea to challenge Russian naval superiority using missiles and unmanned surface vessels. (Also read: Philippines should avoid getting involved in the Ukraine-Russia conflict)
Analysts studying Taiwan have argued that the main lesson is not the drone itself but the concept of a layered denial strategy that restricts an adversary’s freedom of movement.
The Philippines has several strategic “choke points”:
The Luzon Strait is the widest and largest in the Philippines, located between Taiwan and Luzon. It serves as a vital international shipping lane and is divided into three main channels: the Bashi, Balintang, and Babuyan channels;
The Tanon Strait is the longest strait entirely within the Philippines, stretching roughly 160 kilometers between the islands of Cebu and Negros;
The San Bernardino Strait separates Bicol Peninsula from Samar island, and connects with the Philippine Sea and the Pacific beyond;
Surigao Strait also connects to the Philippine Sea through the Bohol Sea and Leyte Gulf;
The Mindoro Strait connects the South China Sea to the Sulu Sea;
The San Juanico Strait is said to be the narrowest in the world, separating the islands of Samar and Leyte, and spanned by the famous San Juanico Bridge; and
The Balabac Strait separates Palawan from Borneo that is part of Malaysia and links the South China Sea with the Sulu Sea.
The Philippines, US and coalition forces conducted a mock amphibious and airborne defense of Balabac at the recent Balikatan war games.
Reuters recently reported that the Bashi Channel and northern Philippine islands are increasingly viewed as strategically important if China carries out its threat to invade Taiwan.
Denial beats parity
The wars in Ukraine and Iran demonstrated that a smaller state does not need to destroy a stronger opponent’s military to succeed. It only needs to deny the stronger power its objectives.
Ukraine’s use of drones, missiles, deception, and dispersed forces has repeatedly imposed disproportionate costs on Russia despite Russia’s larger military.
For the Philippines, this implies a “porcupine” or “layered denial” strategy rather than attempting to build a conventional fleet capable of competing directly with a major power. The goal would be to make operations in Philippine waters and around key islands dangerous, expensive, and uncertain.
Military planners here see the need for the Philippines to develop and deploy more air and naval drones (especially loitering munitions), mobile anti-ship missile batteries, electronic warfare systems and distributed sensors.
Another major lesson from Ukraine and Iran is that survival depends on dispersion.
Large headquarters, centralized logistics hubs, and concentrated forces have become increasingly vulnerable to drone surveillance and precision strikes. Iran, drawing lessons from Israel’s successful assassination operations in Beirut as well as Tehran, embarked on a decentralization of command, particularly in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard hierarchy. They also reportedly spread out their missile and drone silos, often keeping them in distant mountain enclaves beyond the reach of Israeli bombers and American Tomahawks.
The clear lesson for the Philippines is to ensure that no single strike cripples its defensive capbilities. That may mean mobile missile batteries, autonomous drone bases, redundant communications and dispersed ammunition storage.
Obviously, the Philippines faces vastly different opportunities and limitations to either Ukraine or Iran.
Ukraine’s battlefield is largely continental, while the Philippines is an archipelago. Some drone tactics that work over land may be less effective across formidable maritime distances.
The lessons from Ukraine and Iran suggests that a Philippine strategy built around chokepoints, unmanned systems, mobile missiles, and resilient distributed networks may offer greater deterrent value than pursuing traditional force-on-force parity with a stronger military.
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