How prepared are the law enforcement agencies in handling espionage cases in the defense sector?

A simple writing job offer turned out to be an attempt to access sensitive and confidential information, Manuel Mogato writes.

Manuel Mogato | March 13, 2026

MANILA — After leaving her low-paying job in the defense sector in 2023, Julia (not her real name) began searching for a part-time writing job as a researcher.

It was not really her expertise, but Julia found an attractive job offer at onlinejobs.ph, a writing part-time for an established and well-respected defense and security platform.

Julia had an eight-year experience as a civilian staff in one of three branches of service in the Philippine military and she wanted to try writing about geopolitical issues, her interest.

It seemed a normal writing job offer but little did Julia know that she was being recruited to pass sensitive military information to China.

China’s intelligence agents have been using online job application platforms, including the popular LinkedIn for professionals, to search for potential and unsuspecting informants. (Also read: Burrowing inside: The China threat is real)

Eager applicants posted their credentials online, mostly military and civilian personnel, bragging expertise and experience in specific fields, such as operations, logistics, civil-military operations, and intelligence.

Others posted having attended defense and military schools, including the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), earning a master’s degree in national security.

Civilians who earned a MNSA degree are commissioned as lieutenant colonels in the reserve force in the Army or Air Force and commanders in the Navy.

China’s intelligence agents have a large pool of talents to select potential informants.

They were always on the lookout for defense sector workers, who are paid low, but have a higher security clearance that can access “secret” documents. (Also read: Old espionage techniques still work, the hunt for traitors continue)

The promise of a handsome payment for a seemingly innocuous job is a natural come-on for any unsuspecting applicant.

For China’s intelligence agents, Julia was the perfect candidate for recruitment.

She had been working on policy papers about the military’s psychological warfare operations for the military.

Sometimes, her sensitive and classified tactical, operational and strategic policy recommendations reached the Armed Forces’ General Headquarters and the defense department in Camp Aguinaldo.

She was willing to be paid 5,000 pesos for a research work, or an opinion piece.

Recruiters cannot promise the applicants that their work would see print in some reputable defense and security platforms, like Jane’s Defense magazine.

Several days later after leaving an application at the online site, a woman had contacted Julia asking what she can offer to write for them about defense and security issues.

The woman became more interested when Julia said she used to have security clearance to access classified reports and information. She also used to sit in ASEAN and other international security technical working groups, coordinating military cooperative projects and activities.

The recruiter, the woman who contacted her through her email, said they were interested to hire her, but wanted to test her knowledge and writing skills.

Based on her experience and expertise, the recruiter asked her to do an analysis and assessment on the Philippines’ ability to create a maritime militia force to match China’s unarmed militia vessels deployed in the West Philippine Sea. She was promised a 5,000 peso payment for the job even if she was on a trial period.

Julia got suspicious. It was a red flag.

At that time in 2023, Congress and the security services, including the law enforcement agencies were busy uncovering Alice Guo’s activities.

Elected mayor in a sleepy town in Tarlac, she was suspected to be a Chinese spy through her Offshore Gambling Operations in Bamban, Tarlac and Porac, Pampanga.

Media went to town about the existence of potential Chinese sleeper cells when authorities uncovered several thousands of foreigners obtaining Filipino citizenship through bribery and other fraudulent means.

Julia did not pursue the job offer as China’s espionage activities were blown up.

She thought it ended there.

Months later, she learned her identity was used to recruit unsuspecting defense sector workers.

She feared authorities might link her to China’s espionage activities because her identity was used in the recruitment efforts for potential informants.

Together with a lawyer friend, they went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to report the identity theft and the recruitment attempt in late 2023.

Julia did not know what happened to the complaint but was confident it would protect her from any criminal complaint if she was linked to any espionage investigation.

Even before reporting the recruitment attempt to law enforcement and the Justice department, Julia had the recruiter and the job sites investigated together with the help of another friend, a programmer and IT expert.

Their personal investigation led them to several Chinese-registered sites and IP addresses.

But, when an influencer wrote about the Chinese recruitment activities, the sites were shut down.

Before the sites were removed, Julia said the modus operandi of these Chinese recruitment sites are identical, recalling her own experience.

They reported the activities of the Chinese recruitment sites to the Philippine National Police but did not get any update, just like with the NBI.

Julia said the modus was similar to what the National Security Council (NSC) had disclosed last week when it confirmed media reports about the arrest of three civilians discovered to be passing classified information to China.

One of the defense department staff caught passing intelligence to Chinese handlers was recruited through LinkedIn.

But they were paid 100,000 pesos for the information shared with China.

It was possible Julia’s complaint could be ignored because she only complained about identity theft.

It was also possible the country’s law enforcement agencies were unprepared to handle espionage cases in the defense and military establishments.

If the NBI and PNP only paid attention to Julia’s complaint, the authorities had put to a stop China’s recruitment activities back in 2023.

The three arrested civilians were also recruited in 2022 or 2023.

It would be better if Julia and her friends reported the 2023 recruitment attempt to the military and the security council.

Julia’s case suggested China’s recruitment efforts could be widespread.

The three arrested civilians could be just tip of the iceberg.

Security agencies should continue investigating and looking for more informants embedded in the government.

There could be more lurking around in and out of the government to betray state and military secrets.