Old espionage techniques still work, the hunt for traitors continue

The hunt for possible sources of infiltration within the government continues. But in the meantime, lawmakers must amend outdated espionage laws, Manny Mogato writes.

Manuel Mogato | March 9, 2026

It was a classic espionage method straight out from an old spy playbook. Materials and money were exchanged in pre-arranged covert locations in the city without meeting face-to-face.

The common technique is called “dead letter box” or “dead drop.”

Based on their own admissions, the three low-level civilian staffers from the defense and military establishments usually get payments by picking cash in unsuspecting public areas, like parks and hollowed out locations near military camps.

They were alerted if the payments are ready for pickup. They also leave behind classified materials in different locations.

On certain occasions, food deliveries were used to deliver cash. The cash hidden inside meals or other items. There were rare instances when the payments were wired to bank accounts.

“Dead drops” were commonly used to exchange materials and payment to avoid detection and maintain operational security between the handler and the recruited agent.

It also reduces the risk of being followed to a meeting, as the drop-off and pick-up occur at different times.

The technique was a Cold War relic but remained to be used by foreign handlers from Russia, China, and other countries. There had been numerous instances in the past when the Federal Bureau of Investigation watched areas used as dead drops to catch traitors within the US defense and security establishments.

“Honey trap” is another popular technique used by foreign recruiters to lure potential informants and spies. Good-looking men and women were used to compromise a target informant and they were co-opted at the risk of being exposed in steamy sexual activities.

In the case of the three low-level civilian staffers, they were tempted by huge monetary rewards and not by sexual favors.

Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad, a spokesman for the Navy’s West Philippine Sea operations, said about four to six figures in Philippine currency regularly changed hands, in exchange for classified materials about defense and military plans, actual operations, and other sensitive information. (Also read: Burrowing inside: The China threat is real)

It all started three to four years ago when young and low-level civilian staffers at the defense and military establishments posted their credentials on social media platforms, like LinkedIn and Facebook.

It did not take long when they got a private message from someone introducing himself or herself as belonging to a reputable think tank or research institution.

They would be offered to write a research paper or an opinion piece of geopolitical and security issues with a promise of a handsome payment.

But the paper or column is not for public use. It would be for private consumption of investors or other clients of the reputable agency.

In the beginning, the information could be harmless but as the payment grows bigger, they were asked to send classified documents and information downloaded from secured computer networks.

They were asked to photograph documents and information from computers and sent through encrypted programs on mobile phones provided by the foreign handlers.

One of the arrested staffers showed a mobile phone with a game called “tetris” but when you opened the program, it would redirect you to an encrypted site where sensitive documents could be uploaded and sent.

The lure of money is very tempting. These low-level staffers need extra cash to sustain their lavish lifestyles and provide more resources to their families.

The three civilian staffers remained low-key and undetected for three to four years until the defense department launched in 2025 the Insider Threat Program (ITP), working hand-in-hand with allies, like the United States.

It was only late in the third and last quarter of 2025 when the treacherous work of the three civilians were uncovered,

By that time, they had passed many secrets to their foreign handlers, believed to be security and intelligence officers from China.

A recent intelligence agreement with the United States may have helped uncover and catch an active Chinese spy network within the defense and military establishments.

Before the Philippines signed a General Security on Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with the United States in November 2024, defense and military installations had loose security measures that allow information leaks and pilferages.

The Philippines was forced to install biometrics and RFID systems to allow only organic and authorized personnel and vetted visitors entry into military camps and civilian offices at the defense department.

Even journalists who have security clearances to enter military camps were checked and required to login every time they enter specific defense and military offices, particularly the intelligence service compound.

The defense and military’s Insider Threat Program has found red flags in the behavior and lifestyle of two low-level civilian staffers - one working at the defense department and another at the Philippine Navy. The civilian employee at the Philippine Navy actually started working at the defense department before his transfer.

The third is a civilian who exploited his friendship with a mid-level Philippine Coast Guard personnel.

A fourth potential spy, a mid-level naval officer, had come forward and reported the recruitment effort.

The “Insider Threat Program” helped screen all civilian and military personnel in the defense and military establishments, including other uniformed agencies.

Sensitive documents were tracked. Authorities will be alerted if anyone downloads files from the computer networks or photocopy hard copies.

Some of the documents have barcodes and the number of copies distributed to concerned offices are tracked.

It would be difficult to steal documents unless an authorized personnel is on the distribution lists.

Thus, it was easy to catch traitors from within.

Trinidad said the cases of the three arrested spies are closed, although the government is still studying what cases would be brought against them.

Philippine laws of treason and espionage are outdated. Congress has to amend the pre-war espionage laws and pass measures attuned with the times.

Trinidad said the hunt for more “spies” deeply embedded in the government’s security agencies continue.

“This could just be the tip of the iceberg,” Trinidad said, as they continued to investigate and look for other potential spies within their midst. “There could be more out there working for the Chinese and other foreign intelligence agencies.”