The Philippines as ASEAN Chair Should Build Bridges of Cooperation Through a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
The Philippines risks tarnishing its credibility as a regional leader, as well as ASEAN's reputation, should the COC remain unresolved this year, international security expert Rommel Banlaoi writes.
Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos Jr. accepts ASEAN chairship gavel from Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim during the closing ceremony of the 47th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia last October 28, 2025.
Rommel Banlaoi | May 6, 2026
From 6 to 8 May 2026, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will convene its 48th Summit in the Metropolitan Cebu area. As the current ASEAN Chair, the Philippines bears a historic responsibility to conclude before the end of its term the long-awaited Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.
COC negotiations have already spanned more than two decades since the adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in 2002. While the DOC represented a milestone in China-ASEAN diplomacy in the South China Sea, it has never been strictly implemented, being a not legally binding arrangement, a gentleman’s agreement, so to speak. In the years since, repeated maritime incidents have underscored the urgency of a stronger legal framework capable of binding all parties to better promote responsible conduct at sea.
For the Philippines, which has experienced both cooperation and confrontation in the South China Sea, the COC represents an opportunity to transform disputes into dialogue and to shift from perennial conflict to perpetual cooperation.
Legal Binding and Practical Flexibility
Manila has consistently emphasized the need for a legally binding COC aligned with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Yet there is also a compelling need to acknowledge the national sensitivities of China and other member states, who may prefer a more flexible, though no less effective, legal approach.
The central challenge for both China and ASEAN is to craft a COC that is principled yet pragmatic: sufficiently credible and enforceable to provide firmer rules-based mechanisms for dispute management, without undermining state sovereignty. A balanced COC should contain provisions urging all parties to uphold the twin principles of self-restraint and due regard that UNCLOS prescribes — principles that the Convention, in fact, treats as obligatory.
China’s Role as a Comprehensive Partner
China’s active participation is indispensable to the entire process. As the largest neighboring power and a major economic partner of every ASEAN member state, Beijing’s constructive engagement is essential not only to the conclusion but also to the eventual enforcement of a COC. As ASEAN Chair, the Philippines must secure China’s support for a meaningful conclusion. The Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) provides a useful platform through which China and the Philippines can coordinate their positions and work in concert toward a common outcome.
While differences among South China Sea parties persist, rooted as they are in distinct and deeply held national interests, the Philippines must consistently highlight areas of common ground, including freedom of navigation, maritime safety, and the sustainable management of marine resources. The COC should be understood and presented as a collaborative instrument designed to promote amity and cooperation, not as a tool for punishment or retribution.
In this regard, the ASEAN principles of regionalism enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) are essential reference points for the conclusion of a COC. The TAC itself can serve as a model: legally binding in character, yet deliberately designed with sufficient flexibility to accommodate peaceful dispute resolution while remaining attentive to the national sensitivities of member states.
ASEAN Unity and Diversity
ASEAN’s enduring strength lies in its widely acknowledged diversity. Among the South China Sea claimants, Vietnam and Malaysia seek stronger and more enforceable safeguards. Other ASEAN members, less directly affected by maritime disputes, prioritize economic growth and regional stability. Cambodia and Laos have historically maintained closer alignment with China on issues of regional governance.
The Philippines must harmonize these varied perspectives by emphasizing that a COC is, at its core, an instrument of predictability: one designed to reduce risks, build trust, and foster operational cooperation at sea. It is a framework for managing differences and not resolving them by fiat in order to identify a sustainable middle ground for cooperation.
Balancing Major Powers
The South China Sea is not exclusively a regional concern. It is, equally, a global security issue. The United States, Japan, India, Australia, and other extra-regional powers have material stakes in the freedom of navigation and in broader maritime security arrangements. The Philippines must balance these external interests with ASEAN’s commitment to centrality and internal unity.
A COC should therefore be crafted with careful awareness of the role of major powers, reassuring them that ASEAN is committed to regional stability and cooperation and not to the entrenchment of rivalry.
By doing so, Manila can help prevent the South China Sea from becoming a theater of great-power confrontation. Indeed, with deft management, the South China Sea can instead become a model of inclusive security cooperation, one that incorporates rather than excludes the interests of extra-regional actors.
Opportunities for Manila
The Philippines enjoys unique and considerable opportunities as ASEAN Chair. It can demonstrate credibility by consistently championing adherence to international law and a rules-based maritime order. It can sustain the momentum of COC negotiations through in-person confidence-building measures and the active practice of preventive diplomacy.
The Philippines can also embed the COC within ASEAN’s broader agenda of economic integration, connectivity, and sustainable development. By positioning the COC as an integral component of ASEAN’s holistic vision, Manila can make the case that peace and prosperity are inseparable, two sides of the same coin, and that the pursuit of regional security is fundamentally intertwined with the pursuit of regional development.
Risks of Failure
Failure to deliver a substantive COC would tarnish not only the Philippines’ standing as a credible regional leader, but also ASEAN’s broader credibility as an institution capable of shaping the direction of regional peace. Such a failure would leave the region more vulnerable to miscalculation and unintended violent encounters at sea. A watered-down COC risks being dismissed and ignored. But a failure to conclude the COC would be a profound diplomatic disappointment, one that could perpetuate the regional uncertainties and strategic anxieties that have long afflicted South China Sea governance.
The Philippines must therefore ensure that the outcome of COC negotiations is both successful and meaningful. Success should be measured not merely by the precision of legal language but by the quality of practical mechanisms with a demonstrated capacity to reduce tensions, build trust, and promote durable cooperation among all parties.
A Defining Test of Leadership
The Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship is, in this sense, a defining test of its diplomatic capacity and regional vision. It must present a COC as a cooperative framework that benefits claimant states, non-claimant states, and other user states alike. A balanced, credible COC will stand as evidence of ASEAN’s ability to manage disputes through peaceful means and to uphold a rules-based regional order while remaining clear-eyed about the realities of international politics.
Toward a Cooperative Future
Ultimately, the Philippines’ leadership of ASEAN will determine whether China-ASEAN negotiations produce a credible, enforceable COC or retreat into mere symbolism. The stakes are considerable: the livelihoods of fishermen, the security of vital sea lanes, and the integrity of regional peace. Success will confer not only diplomatic prestige upon Manila but also a lasting legacy of bridge-building in one of the world’s most strategically contested maritime regions.
In this endeavor, Manila’s leadership will be judged not by confrontation but by its capacity to build bridges, to generate consensus, to foster trust, and to secure the conditions for a stable region conducive for cooperation.
Rommel C. Banlaoi, PhD, is the Director of the Philippines-China Studies Center (PCSC) at Diliman College and President of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies (PSISS).