The Strategic Intelligence Assessment on Ukraine Putin Underestimated (Part II)

Security expert Ret. Col. Dencio Acop breaks down further how Ukraine is adapting to gain the upper hand against a larger enemy in the second part of his assessment on the Russia-Ukraine war.

Photo by Žilvinas Ka on Unsplash

COL Dencio S. Acop (Ret), PhD, CPP | April 27, 2026

Read part one.

This is part 2 of my article on the study paper I wrote at the Intelligence School, Armed Forces of the Philippines when I took my Strategic Intelligence Course. I did a country study on Ukraine. Humility aside, it was the top paper. It’s been updated to suit my current topic. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the points I raised in the study were validated. Not only were they validated as they proved intractable, but the points raised also illustrated that Ukraine’s strengths were foundational to its resilience, overcoming its vulnerabilities, and welcoming to the modern innovations of today.

Astute leaders planning to invade Ukraine would have thought twice about pushing through with their offensive unless they were well convinced that decisive victory could be attained within a reasonable amount of time and casualties. If he wasn’t in such haste and rage, Vladimir Putin could have read Ukraine’s most probable course of action and made it his own. But, overtaken by overconfidence, much of it owing to Russia’s nuclear arsenal which Ukraine had none, the Russian leader thought Ukraine was ripe for the taking in just a few days. It must be recalled that Ukraine had given up its stockpile of nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for its trusted support (along with that of the United States) after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Ukraine was more than just an adjunct of Russian power. It was itself a power. That is why the Ukraine invasion could never have been Putin’s Six-Day War. Ukraine as Russia’s Second Afghanistan War is more like it. This updated assessment illustrates this. (Also read: Escalating Russia-Ukraine War: There is No Substitute for Peace)

ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE

VULNERABILITIES

As of early 2026, Russia maintains a larger overall military than Ukraine, with approximately 1.32 million active personnel compared to Ukraine’s 900,000. While Ukraine has rapidly expanded its forces, Russia holds a significant advantage in heavy weaponry – nearly 5 times more aircraft and 5 times more tanks. Russia maintains roughly 5,630 main battle tanks against Ukraine’s 1,121. Russia also has a vast advantage in air power with over 4,200 aircraft compared to Ukraine’s estimated 347. Moreover, Russia has a significantly larger naval fleet of 747 vessels, while Ukraine has only 169. Russia’s defense budget is drastically higher, exceeding $200 billion in some estimates vis-à-vis Ukraine’s significantly lower expenditure.

What has been described thus far has been Ukraine’s vulnerabilities to Russia’s conventional forces alone. However, the total Russian threat Ukraine faces includes Russia’s unconventional weapons systems, even if such is not normally discussed. It must be pointed out, however, that the nuclear threat is real, simply because these weapons exist. It must be recalled that Russian leader Vladimir Putin has, in the past, and relative to the war, issued the threat of using tactical nuclear warheads against Ukraine and its NATO allies. Russia possesses the world’s largest nuclear weapons arsenal, with over 5,500 total warheads. It operates 36-42 nuclear reactors, generating approximately 18-20% of its electricity. Russia is also a global leader in nuclear technology, currently building several new reactors and exporting reactor technology worldwide. In contrast, Ukraine has none of the nuclear warheads possessed by its enemy. It surrendered its Soviet-era warheads to Russia years ago in exchange for defense protection which Russia has reneged on by invading Ukraine in 2022.

CAPABILITIES

While Russia has more total troops, Ukraine’s army is highly motivated and supported by Western intelligence and equipment. Ukraine added to its personnel count by mobilizing large numbers of reserves into its Territorial Defense Forces.

Ukraine’s primary military advantages include a massive, innovative domestic drone industry producing millions of units, highly skilled and Western-trained personnel, and a “battle-hardened” force utilizing real-time artificial intelligence and superior tactical, decentralized leadership. These capabilities allow for effective asymmetric warfare and long-range, deep-strike operations.

Asymmetric Drone Warfare

Ukraine has developed a formidable arsenal of aerial, sea, and ground-based drones, which are responsible for an estimated 70% of casualties and allow for strikes on Russian infrastructure. (PODCAST: Pilot Ep: Drone warfare)

Battle-hardened and Trained Personnel

The Armed Forces of Ukraine are considered the most experienced in Europe, having transitioned from Soviet tactics to NATO-style, small-unit leadership, often led by empowered non-commissioned officers.

Domestic Defense Industry and Innovation

Roughly 76% of weapons and equipment are now produced or maintained domestically. This includes advanced, home-grown drone manufacturing.

Rapid Technological Adaptation

Ukraine is a testing ground for next-generation warfare, utilizing AI for target identification and operating a “digitalized” military to improve operational efficiency.

Strategic Deep-Strike Capabilities

Ukraine has built a robust capacity to strike long-range targets inside Russia, targeting strategic military production and energy infrastructures.

Defense Alliances

Ukraine’s current defense alliances are largely structured through long-term bilateral security agreements with over 30 countries (including the UK, France, Germany, US) and a strong, evolving partnership with NATO (including the NATO-Ukraine Council). Major initiatives include the 57-country Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein Group) for military aid and the 35-member “Coalition of the Willing” focusing on long-term security commitments. (Also read: Dangerous recruitment)

Key Defense Alliances and Frameworks:

Bilateral Security Agreements (10-Year Pacts)

Throughout 2024, Ukraine signed 10-year security cooperation agreements with several countries, including the UK, France, Germany, Denmark, Canada, Italy, The Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Japan, and Estonia. These agreements focus on long-term military support, defense industry cooperation, and intelligence sharing.

NATO-Ukraine Relations

While not a NATO member, Ukraine has a “distinctive partnership” with NATO aimed at eventual membership, as outlined in its National Security Strategy. The NATO-Ukraine Council serves as a joint body for consultations, and NATO allies provide extensive training, equipment, and support.

Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein Group)

Ukraine is a member of this group, which is a coalition of 57 countries (including all 32 NATO members) and the EU, which meets regularly to coordinate military aid, such as air defense systems and ammunition.

Coalition of the Willing

A group of 34 nations, along with Ukraine, aimed at providing long-term security support and preparing for potential peacekeeping roles post-ceasefire.

EU Security Commitments

The European Union signed a security agreement, strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and European defense sectors.

Strategic Partnerships in the Gulf

Recent agreements were signed in 2026 with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, focusing on military-technical cooperation, drone production, and air defense.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

VULNERABILITIES

Vulnerability associated with availability of transportation and communication assets

In the same manner that transportation and communication assets can work in favor of the state, these too can work in favor of the invaders. The availability of railways, waterways, roadways, and communication assets can likewise facilitate the advance of the occupying force into the territory of Ukraine. The implication of this possibility is the potential for quicker occupation of Ukrainian territory compared to the times when no such contemporary facilitators were yet available making invasions longer and costlier.

In the current war with Russia, Ukraine’s transportation and communication vulnerabilities are largely driven by kinetic and cyber warfare, with Russia targeting critical infrastructure such as rail networks, power grids, and telecommunication systems. Key vulnerabilities include damaged rail lines, cyberattacks on service providers like Kyivstar, and reliance on vulnerable, unencrypted communication systems.

Transportation Vulnerabilities (Logistics and Infrastructure):

Railroad Network Damage – The Ukrainian rail system has suffered extensive physical damage, with thousands of objects destroyed and many workers killed, forcing reliance on emergency protocols. The state-owned railway operator, Ukrzaliznytsia, suffered a systematic, complex, and multi-layered cyberattack disrupting ticket sales in March 2025. Constant damage to infrastructure from missile attacks requires continuous repairs.

Logistics Center Vulnerability – Large transport hubs, supply centers, and shipping infrastructure, including ports, are highly susceptible to long-range precision strikes.

Declining Maritime Transport – The maritime network has seen a significant diminution in size due to the war. The network dropped from 1,392 in 2021 to just 491 in 2022.

Gauge Differences – The need for time-consuming wheel-swapping at the EU border (1,520mm to 1,435mm) slows down cargo transport.

Integration – Future strategies focus on aligning with the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) by 2030, including building new roads to Romania and Moldova and creating multi-modal terminals at Western borders.

Communication Vulnerabilities (Digital and Infrastructure):

Cyber Warfare on Telecommunications – Major attacks, such as the 2022 Kyivstar incident, have left millions without mobile or internet access, severely hindering logistics.

Wiper Malware and DDoS Attacks – Russian state-sponsored actors frequently use wiper malware (e.g., WhisperGate, CaddyWiper) and disruptive Distributed Denial of Service attacks against government, energy, and financial sectors. The use of Industroyer2 by Sandworm attackers against electric substations highlights the vulnerability of the industrial control system.

Operational Communications Failure – Reliance on unencrypted commercial analog radios has resulted in, at times, compromised operational security, leading to the identification and elimination of personnel.

Critical Infrastructure Targets – The power grid remains a high-value target for cyber-attacks intended to disrupt operational technology (OT).

CAPABILITIES

Ukraine’s transportation and communication infrastructure is highly developed but currently heavily stressed, adapting to war conditions with a focus on westward integration with European networks. While traditional, extensive Soviet-era rail and road networks remain operational, they have required massive repairs, with roughly 6,300 kms of rail track destroyed or damaged by 2023. While disruptive, the war has also given Ukraine the opportunity to rebuild and upgrade its obsolete infrastructure whenever it can through the conflict.

Transportation Capabilities:

Railways (Primary Lifeline) – State-run Ukrzaliznytsia operates a 21,700 km network (broad gauge), holding a monopoly on passenger transport and carrying a high volume of freight. Rail is the primary method for bulk export (grain, ore, steel) and passenger evacuation.

Road Network – Comprises 169,700+ kms of roads. The “Big Construction” program repaired 14,000+ kms of roads before 2022, though many are now damaged by military traffic. Road transport has increased significantly for exports due to seaport blockades, causing bottlenecks at Western borders.

Maritime / Waterways – Before the war, 60% of exports passed through Black Sea ports like Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny. Operations are currently limited, relying on the “grain corridor” and Danube River ports like Izmail and Reni.

Aviation – Civilian airspace has been closed since February 2022. Major airports like Boryspil are non-functional for commercial flights.

Adaptation – The “State Transport Special Service” (part of the Ministry of Defense) rapidly repairs rail lines and bridges. There is a push to expand standard-gauge (1,435 mms) rail lines to better connect with the EU.

Communication Capabilities:

Mobile Network – Despite the conflict, the mobile network is highly resilient with widespread 4G/LTE coverage in major cities (Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro).

Providers – Three main operators dominate: Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and lifecell.

Connectivity – Mobile data remains generally reliable for messaging, navigation, and internet access, supported by adapted infrastructure.

Satellite and Resiliency – The military and critical infrastructure rely on satellite systems, including Starlink to maintain communications, particularly when conventional digital infrastructure is damaged.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

VULNERABILITIES

Ukraine’s scientific and technical vulnerabilities are deeply intertwined with the ongoing war, which has targeted critical infrastructure, severed research networks, and accelerated a “brain drain” of talent. Key vulnerabilities include heavy reliance on specific, foreign-provided technologies, persistent cyber threats targeting energy and communications, and the physical destruction of specialized research institutions.

Critical Infrastructure and Energy Vulnerabilities:

Grid Fragility – Despite resilience, the energy grid remains vulnerable to physical attacks on high-voltage substations, leading to deficits, as 51% of generation capacity was lost between early 2022 and mid-2023.

Legacy Systems – A significant portion of the grid relies on older, Soviet-era equipment, which is difficult to replace due to a declining manufacturing base.

Nuclear Safety – Attacks on energy infrastructure have caused instability at major nuclear power plants (like the Zaporizhzia NPP), requiring specialized, hard-to-maintain, and sometimes unavailable replacement parts for safe operation.

Cyber and Information Technology Vulnerabilities:

Data Vulnerabilities – Early in the conflict, local data storage was highly susceptible to physical destruction or theft, necessitating a massive migration to foreign, cloud-based servers.

Persistent Cyber Warfare – Russian threats, such as the “Sandworm” group, constantly target critical infrastructure (water, energy, heat) using “wiper” malware that permanently destroys data.

Dependence on Third-Party Tech – Dependence on single, foreign-supplied technologies like SpaceX’s Starlink for essential communication creates a potential single point of failure.

Vulnerability to Electronic Warfare – GPS jamming and signal intelligence (SIGINT) by adversaries frequently degrade the efficiency of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision-guided systems, forcing reliance on manual navigation.

Scientific and Research Infrastructure Vulnerabilities:

Brain Drain – Continued conflict and damaged research facilities (universities, labs) have forced many researchers to relocate, leading to a significant loss of intellectual capital.

Lack of Long-Term Investment – The war has deprioritized funding for scientific research, with the 2022 plan highlighting that scientific infrastructure is not an immediate priority, crippling long-term projects.

Destruction of Laboratories – Physical damage to institutions, especially in eastern Ukraine, has destroyed unique equipment and research, particularly in nuclear physics and material science.

Industrial and Operational Vulnerabilities:

Supply Chain Disruption – Traditional logistics models have failed, with key transportation hubs (rail, ports, bridges) facing constant risk, delaying the movement of technical equipment.

Limited Domestic Production – Ukraine is heavily reliant on foreign partners for high-end technical components, particularly for defense, making it vulnerable to international procurement delays and political changes.

Environmental and Technological Safety Vulnerabilities:

Environmental Hazards – Damage to industrial facilities (chemical plants, wastewater treatment) causes the leakage of hazardous materials, which is then exacerbated by issues like the flooding from the Kakhovka dam destruction.

Data Weaponization – Theft of data from non-profit and public organizations allows for targeted espionage.

Challenges and Structural Shifts: While innovation is high, the industry faces challenges in scaling production and maintaining a sustainable economic model, as high-level defense spending is partly sustained by Western aid and private funding.

CAPABILITIES

Ukraine’s scientific and technical capabilities have undergone a rapid transformation, evolving from a post-Soviet industrial base into a global hub for defense-tech innovation, AI, and cybersecurity, driven by the need to combat a larger adversary. The country’s capabilities are characterized by an agile, decentralized, and bottom-up innovation ecosystem that allows for the swift development, testing, and deployment of new technologies directly on the battlefield.

Key Defense and Technical Capabilities:

Unmanned Systems (UAVs, USVs, UGVs) – Ukraine has become a world leader in drone technology, producing roughly 2 million drones in 2024, including FPV drones, long-range kamikaze drones, and AI-enabled aerial systems. In 2024, 96.2% of all unmanned aerial vehicles used by the armed forces were domestically produced.

Maritime Drones – Ukraine developed, from scratch, a fleet of unmanned surface vessels (USVs) such as the Magura-7, capable of attacking and damaging Russian naval vessels.

Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning – Ukrainian firms are developing stand-alone AI-driven software for automatic target recognition (ATR), target tracking, and autonomous navigation, allowing drones to function even when GPS is jammed. This AI integration extends to automating 99% of human labor in analyzing video and intercepted communication data.

Combat Software and Digitalization – Ukraine has built a “digital front line” through apps like Delta (situational awareness), Kropyva (artillery targeting), and e-PPO (crowd-sourced air defense), which significantly shorten the decision-making cycle.

Electronic Warfare – Private Ukrainian companies have developed advanced EW systems, some of which are considered to outperform European counterparts, specialized in protecting frontline equipment.

Aerospace and Engineering – Building on a strong, historical Soviet-era foundation, Ukraine continues to possess capabilities in rocketry and transport aircraft manufacturing. It is currently developing a new land-attack cruise missile based on the Neptune platform.

Innovation Ecosystem and Infrastructure:

Brave1 Platform – Established in April 2023, this platform serves as a central hub for defense innovation, bringing together scientists, technicians, and investors to turn ideas into weapons.

Private-Public Partnership – The defense industry is increasingly driven by private firms that are faster and more agile than state-owned enterprises, with support from the Ministry of Digital Transformation.

Cybersecurity and IT Sector – Prior to the war, Ukraine was already a top IT exporter. These skills were redirected to create robust cybersecurity measures and to conduct digital intelligence, including face-recognition technologies.

BIOGRAPHICAL INTELLIGENCE

VULNERABILITIES

Such vulnerabilities in Ukraine primarily stem from the massive, sustained Russian cyber-campaign aimed at harvesting personal identifiable information (PII) of citizens, military personnel, and government officials, often utilizing cyber-enabled psychological operations and data breaches to map, target, and manipulate individuals.

Key biographical and personal intelligence vulnerabilities include:

Compromise of State Registries and Citizen Data – Russian actors have accessed demographic data from Ukrainian registries, which were used to aid in political manipulation and identifying individuals in occupied areas, such as in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

Targeting of Personal Devices and Apps – The high usage of cellphones by civilians to report Russian troop positions, while militarily effective, creates a vulnerability where citizens are identified and targeted, potentially raising issues under international humanitarian law.

Phishing and Social Engineering of Personnel – Attackers, often linked to the Russian GRU, have used phishing attacks, including fake security alerts and phishing campaigns aimed at the military and government officials, to harvest credentials and personal data.

Doxing and Shaming of Service Members – The HUR (Ukrainian Intelligence) noted that Russian threats often involve publishing personal details (names, ranks, dates of birth) of Ukrainian service members and their families, with the intention of psychological pressure and facilitating, sometimes in coordination with, kidnapping or coercion in occupied regions.

Digital Surveillance in Occupied Territories – Russia has engaged in rerouting internet traffic in occupied areas through its own networks, enabling the blocking of local, trusted information sources and facilitating the surveillance of local populations.

Vulnerability of Digital Infrastructure (Diia) – As a key component of Ukraine’s digital identity, the “Diia” application and related government digital services are prime targets for attacks seeking to steal personal and authorization data, causing potential trust issues within the population.

These vulnerabilities are part of a broader strategy of “hybrid warfare” that merges cyber-attacks with kinetic military operations, using personal data to target key personnel, erode morale, and influence public opinion.

CAPABILITIES

Ukraine’s capabilities in this area, primarily driven by the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), have evolved into a sophisticated network focused on identifying, tracking, and targeting Russian personnel, collaborators, and infiltrators. These capabilities combine deep human intelligence networks inside Russia, advanced open-source intelligence, and, for a time, close cooperation with Western intelligence partners to build detailed dossiers on adversaries.

Key Biographical Intelligence Capabilities:

Targeting Russian Personnel – Ukrainian intelligence, particularly the HUR led by Kyrylo Budanov, utilizes a vast network of informants and dissidents within Russia to identify military bloggers, officials, and high-ranking personnel.

Counter-Infiltration and Collaborator Identification – The SBU has developed advanced capabilities in identifying Russian infiltrators and collaborators within Ukraine, using digital tools and social media monitoring to detect, locate, and apprehend them.

In-Depth HUMINT and “Deep Cover” – Ukrainian intelligence, often with CIA support, has mastered operations that involve deep immersion into Russian environments, including “Operation Goldfish”, which trained agents to pose as Russians in third countries for intelligence gathering.

OSINT and Data Analysis – Ukraine heavily utilizes open-source data, social media analysis, and cyber capabilities to map out personal information of soldiers and officers.

Recruitment of New Generation Officers – To prevent penetration by Russian intelligence, new units within HUR (such as Unit 2245) were formed by recruiting officers born after Ukrainian independence, removing previous Soviet-era cultural links to Russia.

Forensic and Technical Expertise – The SBU’s research institutes provide sophisticated technical, forensic, and document analysis to support biographical investigations.

Key Intelligence Actors:

HUR (Main Directorate of Intelligence) – Focuses on foreign intelligence, military intelligence, and, increasingly, exceptionally high-risk special missions against key Russian figures, including deep-penetration operations.

SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) – Focuses on counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and protecting state secrets, effectively rooting out Russian spies and collaborators inside Ukraine.

SZRU (Foreign Intelligence Service) – Involved in gathering political, economic, and technical intelligence, contributing to the broader understanding of Russian decision-making.

Operational Impacts:

High-Value Targeting – The ability to gather actionable intelligence has enabled Ukraine to conduct targeted actions against high-value Russian individuals, reducing their sense of safety even deep within Russian territory.

Operational Security – The SBU’s counterintelligence efforts, while facing challenges from entrenched infiltration early in the 2022 invasion, have been described as effectively mitigating Russian subversive activities.

Countering Misinformation – Ukraine uses its biographic intel to provide evidence of Russian actions, refuting misinformation in real-time, and bolstering its information warfare efforts.

PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

As of early 2026, Russia is perceived to maintain the numerical advantage in personnel and materiel forcing Ukraine into a still defensive, war of attrition. It is assessed, therefore, that Ukraine’s key objectives at this point of the war are to: Make the war too costly for Russia to continue; Prevent Russian breakthroughs; and Create favorable conditions for negotiations (often defined as the return of all occupied territory).

Key probable actions include:

“Active Defense” Strategy – Ukraine is largely adopting a defensive posture, using defense-in-depth, building fortifications, and leveraging technology (such as drones and electronic warfare) to attrite Russian forces, which face high casualties during assaults.

Continued Long-Range Strikes on Infrastructure – Ukraine is likely to continue, and expand, drone and missile strikes deep into Russian territory, specifically targeting oil refineries, fuel depots, and logistical nodes to disrupt the Russian economy and war machine.

Expansion of Domestic Drone Production – With a goal of producing millions of drones annually, Ukraine is prioritizing the industrial-scale production of aerial, ground, and maritime drones to compensate for shortages in traditional artillery ammunition.

Kursk Offensive and Potential Territorial Swaps – Following the August 2024 offensive into Russia’s Kursk region, Ukraine may use this territory for leverage in negotiations, attempting to exchange it for occupied Ukrainian lands.

Holding Key Frontline Areas – While prioritizing defense, Ukrainian forces are focused on maintaining control of critical territory in the east and south, such as the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, to prevent further Russian advancements toward key cities like Pokrovsk.

Pushing for International Security Guarantees – Amidst evolving international political situations, Ukraine continues to push for solidified, long-term security guarantees, including NATO membership, or “under the umbrella” arrangements to protect government-controlled territory.

Exploiting Natural Resources for Foreign Support – As part of the “Victory Plan”, Ukraine is proposing to offer the US and European allies joint access to its critical mineral resources (lithium, titanium) to secure sustained economic and military aid.

Recruitment and Optimization of Manpower – Facing personnel challenges, Ukraine is working to maximize its available manpower through revamped recruitment and training efforts to sustain the fight.

Overall, Ukraine is expected to continue adapting to its rapidly evolving environment, sustain realistic training through this environment, and expand its public-private collaboration between military, government, and commercial entities across multiple domains, foreign and domestic.